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ABSTRACT
Impacts from major storms, floods, hurricanes, and heavy precipitation
events disturb the lives of millions of people around the world every year, causing
billions of dollars of damages and economic losses. As the number and destructiveness
of natural disasters increase, the study of resilience offers possible solutions for
minimizing loss of life and damage from disasters. Resiliency of communities and
organizations in the face of global climate change is attracting increasing attention as a
way to slow or reverse the increasing costliness and disruption of natural disasters.
Despite the growing interest in resilience, no research focuses on the particular resilience
challenges facing emergency response organizations (EROs), police, fire, emergency
medical service, emergency management agencies, and departments of public work,
which communities rely on for critical life-safety services during and after disasters.
The first portion of this study uses the Delphi method to build a list of expertderived factors contributing to emergency response organization (ERO) resilience,
including ranking and rating the factors to develop an expert consensus-based set of
factors composing the ERO Resiliency Framework. This framework supports decision
making and planning priorities to develop stronger, more resilient, emergency response
agencies. The second stage of this research uses the ERO Resiliency Framework to
develop a reference mental model of ERO resilience and compares 41 ERO leaders in
three coastal municipalities to the reference model and each other. The gaps in the ERO
leaders’ mental models revealed by this assessment provide insights into how ERO
leaders understand resilience in their organizations and highlight opportunities for
tailored education and outreach efforts, as well as suggesting future research areas.

The third portion of this research focuses on the role of social capital in ERO
resilience, analyzing the ERO leaders’ levels and types of social capital. Social networks
of relationships between individuals within the same organization form more resilient
teams, while strong network relationships between organizations provide essential
resources, support, and information during times of crisis.
This research provides key insights into the factors contributing to ERO
resilience, ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience, and how social capital can
contribute to building strong, more resilient response organizations. Building resilient
EROs is an essential component in the development of resilient communities, and the
results of this research highlight key areas to focus future education and planning efforts
as well as suggesting areas for future research.
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PREFACE
This dissertation is written in the manuscript format containing a brief
introduction, three independent chapters, and a conclusion. The three chapters form three
articles that are in preparation for submission for publication. The goal of this dissertation
is to identify the factors contributing to emergency response organizations’ (EROs)
resilience, assess ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience to identify
comprehensiveness and balance, and analyze ERO leaders’ levels of social capital.
The first article consists of a Delphi study of emergency response experts to
determine the key factors contributing to ERO resilience. Eleven key factors are
identified, forming the Emergency Response Organization Resiliency Framework, and
providing a foundation for further research on ERO resilience.
The second article applies mental model assessment methods to ERO leaders to
assess and compare their mental models of resilience in their organizations to the
reference model. Mental model comprehensiveness and balance are analyzed to identify
gaps in ERO leaders’ default and complete models to inform future research, planning,
and education efforts.
The third article measures ERO leaders’ levels and types of social capital to
describe social capital’s contributions to ERO resilience. Despite having overall high
levels of social capital, it is important for EROs to focus on developing and maintaining
strong relationships and networks between organizations prior to disasters.
The three chapters are followed by a conclusion chapter that summarizes all three
manuscripts and highlights areas for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
Emergency response organizations (EROs) are a critical component of
communities’ disaster response, emergency preparedness, and resilience planning efforts;
yet they are not included in current research efforts focusing on community and
organizational resilience. As increasing academic and popular attention is applied to the
topic of resilience, it is essential that EROs are included in the research. Local EROs are
uniquely positioned to increase resiliency to climate-related disasters through emergency
preparedness and response. In addition, EROs have extensive experience in emergency
planning and response and provide critical public safety functions. Due to the importance
of community-level adaptation, local emergency planning and disaster preparedness
efforts must include a focus on local-level EROs in order to increase community
resilience. Identifying essential factors contributing to emergency response organization
resilience provides a dual benefit of improving current organizational resilience while
establishing a framework for long-term community resilience growth. Emergency
preparedness, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation are all aspects of a
central goal: increasing communities’ capacity to successfully survive and overcome
increasingly intense and frequent climate-related natural disasters.
This study, building off of previous research in the organizational resilience field and
proposing a model of ERO resilience factors, provides recommendations for
improvements in the resilience of emergency response organizations that will ultimately
result in enhanced community resilience to current disasters and projected climate change
impacts in the future. Using the Delphi method, this research developed a list of expertderived factors contributing to Emergency Response Organization (ERO) resilience, then
1

ranked and rated the factors to develop an expert consensus-based set of ERO resilience
factors forming the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Resiliency Framework.
The factors ranked by the expert panel as most important with high levels of consensus
provide a framework to apply organizational resilience principals to emergency response
organizations.
The development of the reference mental model of resilience in EROs derived from
the ERO Resiliency Framework demonstrates one application of the expert-consensus
driven resiliency framework. Assessing ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience in their
organizations reveals key gaps in comprehensiveness and balance. Although the ERO
leaders had relatively well balanced default mental models, the significant increase in
comprehensiveness between the default and complete models indicates that ERO leaders
are focusing on a narrower aspect of resilience and would benefit from additional
trainings and education. As ERO leaders build a greater comfort level and knowledge of
the nuances of ERO resilience core components, they will be better prepared to
incorporate resiliency-building strategies in their plans, procedures, and trainings.
In addition to examining their mental models of resilience, this study explores
ERO leaders’ levels and types of social capital to develop a better understanding of how
EROs approach relationships and social network building. Strong networks of
relationships between members of a team and between individuals in different
organizations can contribute to organizations’ social capital, thus providing the
organization with better access to information, resources, and support during times of
crisis. All of these aspects contribute to building stronger, more resilient EROs that are
better able to withstand impacts and continue providing essential services to their
2

communities when disasters strike. In order to continue fulfilling their critical function in
a rapidly changing world, emergency response organizations must incorporate resiliencybuilding actions and strategies in their daily operating policies and procedures as well as
their disaster plans.
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Abstract
As the frequency and destructiveness of natural disasters increases due to climatic
changes and expanding development in vulnerable areas, the study of resilience offers
possible solutions for minimizing losses from disasters. Much academic attention in the
literature on resilience focuses on community and organizational resilience generally;
however, the specific resilience factors essential to emergency response organizations
have not been identified in previous research. This study used the Delphi method to build
a list of expert-derived factors contributing to emergency response organization (ERO)
resilience, including ranking and rating the factors to develop an expert consensus-based
set of factors composing the ERO Resiliency Framework. This framework supports
decision making and planning priorities to develop stronger, more resilient, emergency
response agencies. Resilience of emergency response organizations directly contributes to
community resilience, leading to stronger communities and organizations that are better
able to survive and thrive in an age of increasing threats and natural disasters.

1.1 Introduction
Impacts from major storms, floods, hurricanes, and heavy precipitation events
disturb the lives of millions across the globe every year, causing billions of dollars of
damages and economic losses (Paton and Johnston, 2017). Three times as many natural
disasters were recorded in the nine years between 2000 and 2009 compared to between
1980 and 1989 (Leaning and Guha-Sapir, 2013). As the number and destructiveness of
natural disasters increases, the field of resilience and organizational resilience is also
gaining academic attention (Somers, 2009; Lee et al., 2013, Keim, 2008; Tsai, 2013).
5

Resiliency of communities and organizations can slow or reverse the increasing
costliness and disruption caused by natural disasters. However, a review of literature
conducted for this study found no scholarship focused on the particular resilience
challenges facing emergency response organizations (EROs), including police, fire,
emergency medical service, emergency management agencies, and departments of public
works, which are relied upon for assisting communities through these disasters.
When natural disasters occur, EROs must provide critical services in challenging and
often dangerous environments, and disasters place increased demand on emergency
services and their resources and personnel. For the purposes of this study, “emergency
response organizations” (EROs) will be defined to include fire departments, emergency
medical services, police departments, public works departments, and Emergency
Management Agency (EMA) departments (Thompson, J. and Durkovich, 2015). The
critical functions provided by EROs are essential for community resiliency, and hence
must be addressed in order to minimize and mitigate the costs of impacts from disasters.
The concept of organizational resilience, defined by Lee et al. (2013) as “the ability of
organizations to continue to operate and to provide goods [and] services,” is directly
applicable to EROs as their services are required throughout natural disasters and major
emergencies. The resilience of EROs is also a critical component of community
resilience due to their provision of key life-safety services including medical, fire and
rescue, and emergency response (Lee et al., 2013). This study, building off of previous
research in the organizational resilience field and proposing a model of ERO resilience
factors, provides recommendations for improvements in the resilience of emergency
response organizations that will ultimately result in enhanced community resilience to
6

current disasters and projected climate change impacts in the future. Using the Delphi
method, this research developed a list of expert-derived factors contributing to
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) resilience, then ranked and rated the factors to
develop an expert consensus-based set of ERO resilience factors. The factors ranked by
the expert panel as most important with high levels of consensus provide a framework to
apply organizational resilience principles to emergency response organizations forming
the Emergency Response Organization Resiliency Framework.
Current organizational resilience literature emphasizes the increasing importance of
resilience to all organizations and examines case studies of non-profit organizations,
retailers, manufacturers, technology suppliers, public utilities, and private contractors
(Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Lee et al., 2013; McManus, 2008). EROs face unique
circumstances, however, because they must face disasters directly while performing
critical services. If EROs are incapacitated or unable to perform their roles during a
disaster there may be severe, possibly life-threatening, consequences for members of the
community. This study: 1) investigates how an ERO resiliency framework differs from
existing frameworks and, 2) identifies factors that mitigate the unique hazard challenges
facing EROs, including climate change related disasters. The resulting framework of
factors contributing to organizational resilience for EROs provides a foundation for
recommendations and guidelines that EROs may implement to improve their resilience.
As climate change impacts become progressively more visible and climate-related
events affect more people, EROs must be resilient in order to continue to operate
successfully and provide critical services (Leaning and Guha-Sapir 2013). Emergency
responders play a key role during natural disasters since these organizations, agencies,
7

and individuals are responsible for protecting life and property during extreme weather
events and the recovery period following major disasters. Local EROs are uniquely
positioned to increase resiliency to climate-related disasters through emergency
preparedness and response because EROs have extensive experience in emergency
planning and response and provide critical public safety functions (Keim, 2008; Tsai,
2013). Due to the importance of community-level adaptation, local emergency planning
and disaster preparedness, efforts to build resilience must focus on local-level EROs
(Yamin et al., 2005; National Academies, 2006). Emergency preparedness, disaster risk
reduction, and climate change adaptation are all aspects of a central goal: increasing
communities’ resilience in order to survive and overcome increasingly intense and
frequent climate-related natural disasters.
1.2 Background
Defining Resilience
The topic of resilience has gained much attention and research interest in the wake of
increasingly frequent and costly natural disasters experienced across the U.S. and around
the world (McManus, 2008; Lee et al., 2013; Rodin, 2014). Resiliency of communities
and organizations in the face of global climate change and large scale disasters is
attracting focus as a way to slow or reverse the increasing costliness and disruption of
natural disasters (Keim, 2008; Yamin et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2013; Rodin, 2014; Somers,
2009). However, resilience is a complex and multi-faceted concept encompassing a wide
range of disciplinary fields and research methodologies, as well as many facets of
societies, from individuals and organizations to cities, states, and countries. The

8

definition of “resilience” varies greatly in the literature based on the discipline and scale
at which resiliency is considered.
While resilience is a broad and complex concept with a wide variety of definitions
and conceptualizations applied to a diversity of disciplines, there are three main
approaches to resiliency thought: engineering resilience, ecological/ecosystem resilience,
and social-ecological resilience. These schools are rooted in the foundation and
development of resiliency theory, from the relatively narrow definition of engineering
resilience of bouncing back to a ‘normal’ condition following a shock or disturbance, to
the ecological resilience understanding of the magnitude of disturbance that can be
experienced before a system moves into a different state, and broadening to include the
variety of definitions discussed in social-ecological resilience literature (Holling, 1973,
Comfort, 2010, Adger et al., 2005, Folke et al., 2002, Aldrich, 2012, Berkes, 2007).This
variety of definitions illustrates the complexity of resiliency as applied in multiple fields
and demonstrates the theoretical development of the concept, from the “bounce back to
normal” component of ecological resiliency (Holling, 1973), to “active resilience”
including the idea of “bouncing forward” incorporating adaptive actions (Somers, 2009),
and even the conceptualization of resilience as a “continuum of experiences” and “state
of becoming” suggested by Walklate et al. (2013).
Many definitions of resilience include references to “bouncing back,” “learning and
adapting,” “absorbing disturbances,” and “capacity to cope” with unexpected
disturbances, sudden changes, or disasters (Masten and Obradovic, 2008; Walkate et al.,
2013; Wildavsky, 1988; Folke et al., 2004; Folke et al., 2002). Despite the breadth of
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possible definitions, some common themes emerge: resilience entails the ability to adapt
to and overcome the unknown and unexpected while retaining essential functions.
The previously discussed definitions of resilience may be considered descriptions of
“passive resilience,” focusing on the ability of organizations to “bounce back” from
“unanticipated dangers” (Wildavsky, 1988). Framed in this manner, passive resilience is
a reaction to an event and reactive in nature (Somers, 2009). In contrast, “active
resilience” can be differentiated as “a deliberate effort to become better able to cope with
surprise” (Lovins and Lovins, 1982; Wildavsky, 1988; Somers, 2009), and thus may be
considered proactive in nature. While passive resilience is discussed more frequently in
the literature and is generally demonstrated after a major disaster or crisis (Wildavsky,
1988), active resilience may be more useful to EROs given the challenges and demands
of their services.
In her book The Resilience Dividend, Rodin defines “resilience” as the “capacity of
any entity – an individual, a community, and organization, or a natural system – to
prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from
a disruptive experience” (Rodin 2014, p. 3). Rodin’s characterization of “resilience”
summarizes many of the components of resilience as defined in the literature and served
as the definition used for the purposes of this study because it is particularly well suited
for application to emergency response organizations. Due to the increasing demands on
emergency response organizations during the response to and recovery from large scale
natural disasters, such as Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017, these organizations must be
able to rapidly recover from impacts while continuing to provide essential services to
their communities.
10

Climate Resilience
The strategic, conceptual perspective of climate resilience contains multiple types
of resilience including community, organizational, economic, social, and ecological
(Comfort, 2010). Thus, on a strategic theoretical level, organizational resilience is a
contributing sub-category of community resilience to climate impacts. Society’s capacity
to adapt to climate change is a key component of climate resilience (Adger, 2003).
Assessing, measuring, and increasing adaptive capacity is a central focus of current
organizational and community resilience literature, resulting in a variety of suggested
methods for quantifying potential and latent resilience (Somers, 2009, Mallak, 1998,
McManus, 2008). These frameworks and assessments provide suggestions and
recommendations for improving organizational and community resilience, thus
increasing the capacity for climate resilience in the larger field of disaster and hazard
resilience to climate change. Networks, institutions, and organizations that promote
resilience to current hazards and vulnerabilities will simultaneously be engaged in
building resilience to climate change in the future (Adger et al., 2005).
Organizational Resilience
Organizational resilience is a complex blend of behaviors, perspectives and
interactions that contribute significantly to the resilience of communities (Somers, 2009,
McManus et al., 2008, Mallak, 1998). Community resilience and organizational
resilience are interdependent concepts; hence, organizational resilience is an important
component of communities’ ability to plan for, respond to, and recover from emergencies
and crises (Lee et al., 2013, McManus et al., 2008, Aldrich, 2012). Organizational
“restoration,” the ability of organizations to regain their essential function, is identified as
11

one of five “dimensions of resilience” following a disaster, supporting the linkage
between organizational resilience and wider community resilience (Aldrich, 2012).
Resilience of EROs as Organizations
There is a diverse literature that discusses measuring and quantifying organizational
resilience and resilience potential. Key studies by Somers (2009), McManus (2008), and
Lee et al. (2013) address measuring organizational resilience potential and measuring and
comparing organizations’ resilience. Somers identified six factors, while McManus
proposed a model consisting of three factors and 15 indicators of organizational resilience
(McManus, 2008; Lee et al., 2013). Lee et al.’s (2013) study expanded on McManus’s
(2008) model, proposing an adjusted model consisting of four factors (Lee et al., 2013, p.
33). Together these studies identify situation awareness, adaptive capacity, planning, and
resilience ethos as key resiliency factors with multiple related indicators including
organizational connectivity, culture of informed decision-making, and transparent
communication within an organization (Somers, 2009; McManus, 2008; Lee et al., 2013).
Although these models of organizational resilience provide a foundation in the literature,
none of the 73 studies reviewed for this research address the specific resilience
challenges facing emergency response organizations (EROs). As the providers of critical
response services during times of major disasters, EROs are vital to the well-being,
survival, and resilience of the communities they serve. Elements of resiliency for EROs
include being able to continue providing essential life-safety and security functions
during any kind of impact or disaster, whether natural or human-caused. Emergency
response organizations are expected to respond to emergency situations in all conditions
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and circumstances, thus resiliency for these organizations must include factors that allow
them to retain essential capabilities and continue providing critical services.
Local EROs are uniquely positioned to increase community resilience through
emergency preparedness and response. In addition, EROs have extensive experience in
emergency planning and response and provide critical public safety functions (Keim,
2008; Tsai, 2013). Due to the importance of community-level adaptation, local
emergency planning and disaster preparedness efforts must include a focus on local-level
EROs in order to increase community resilience (Yamin et al., 2005; National
Academies, 2006). Identifying essential factors contributing to emergency response
organization resilience provides a dual benefit of improving current organizational
resilience while supporting a framework for long-term community resilience growth.
Emergency preparedness, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation are all
aspects of a central goal: increasing communities’ capacity to successfully survive and
overcome increasingly intense and frequent climate-related natural disasters.
1.3 Methodology
The Delphi Process
The Delphi process is a widely-accepted method of achieving expert consensus
concerning a specific problem or issue from a group of individuals with identified
expertise in the topic area. Originally developed in the 1950’s by Dalkey and Helmer
(1963) at the RAND Corporation for use in U.S. military projects, the Delphi method has
been used to build consensus and solve problems in diverse fields such as coastal
management, business management, and nursing (Hsu and Sandford, 2007). The Delphi
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method is particularly useful when there is incomplete knowledge about a problem
(Delbeq et al., 1975; Skulmoski, et al., 2007) and the method’s flexibility has resulted in
its use in many sectors including climate change adaptation, vulnerability analysis, health
care, defense, business, education, information technology, community resilience and
recovery, and construction engineering (Webster et al., 2003; Mastrandrea and Schneider,
2004; Arnell, Tompkins, and Adger, 2005; Morgan, Adams, and Keith, 2006; de Franca
Doria et al., 2009; Hallowell and Gambatese, 2010; Skulmoski, et al., 2007; Okoli and
Pawlowski, 2004; Alshehri, Rezgui, and Li, 2015; Jordan and Javernick-Will, 2013).
This study used the Delphi method to build a list of expert-derived factors
contributing to Emergency Response Organization (ERO) resilience, then rank and rate
the factors to develop an expert consensus-based set of ERO resilience factors. The
Delphi method was selected for this research based on its rigorous methodology for
obtaining expert consensus from individuals across a wide geographical area (Sillars and
Hallowell, 2009; Jordan and Javernick-Will, 2013).
Emergency Management and Response Expert Panel Selection
In order to begin the Delphi process, a panel of experts were recruited from
emergency management and response professionals using professional organization
membership lists, lead researchers in the field, and emergency management associations.
Previous Delphi studies have used panels of varying sizes, from as low as three to as high
as 80 members, however most studies include eight to 16 panelists (Hallowell and
Gambatese, 2010). For the purposes of this research, 30 experts were initially recruited
for the study from the East Coast region with 20 completing all three rounds. The East
Coast region reaching from Maine to the mid-Atlantic was chosen for the purposes of this
14

study in order to reduce variability regarding the structure of emergency response
organizations and the types of hazards expected. The selected panelists included experts
in the fields of emergency response, emergency planning, organizational resilience, and
emergency and disaster management.
Experts were intentionally selected from multiple backgrounds and disciplines in
order to provide diverse insights in identifying factors contributing to resilience of EROs.
The initial panel of 30 experts were collected through a review of current published
literature in the field of emergency management and response, identification of leading
academic researchers, directors and managers of agencies and departments at the local,
state, and regional level, and experienced leaders of emergency response departments in
the East Coast region. During the expert recruitment process, potential panelists were
divided into three categories, Academic/Research, Administrative/Policy, and Field
Practitioner, to ensure the various aspects of emergency management, response,
resilience, and planning were represented in the final expert panel (Table 1.1). Panelists
in the Academic/Research category primarily served in professor or lecturer positions in
universities and focused their work on teaching and researching emergency response and
management related topics. Individuals in the Administrative/Policy category worked in
management and oversight agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency (RIEMA), the Department of
Health (DOH), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Field Practitioner panelists
served in their primary capacity as emergency responders in fire departments, emergency
medical service departments, police departments, and municipal emergency management
agencies.
15

Table 1.1. Expert panel composition.
Category

Initial
n

Final
n

Academic/Research

10

6

Average #
of years’
experience
24

Administrative/Policy

10

7

22

Field Practitioner

10

7

28

Examples of agencies
and organizations
Professors/lecturers in
academic institutions
Management/oversight
agencies, FEMA,
RIEMA, DOH, DHS
Fire departments,
emergency medical
services, police
departments, municipal
emergency management
agencies

The criteria required to participate as an expert in a Delphi study vary based on
the research topic; however, it is essential that clear criteria are identified prior to expert
recruitment to ensure all panelist meet the determined criteria (Delbecq et al., 1975;
Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004; Jordan and Javernick-Will, 2013). All experts selected for
the Delphi expert panel in this study met the minimum requirements of (1) at least 5
years’ experience working in emergency management, response, or planning, (2) current
leadership or management position in their organization or agency, (3) field experience in
at least one emergency response or recovery, (4) knowledge/expertise concerning
emergency management, response, planning, and/or resilience verified through
publications in peer reviewed journals or presentations and lectures as appropriate to the
field. All panelists selected in the Academic/Research category met the additional
requirements of holding an advanced degree (Masters or PhD) in a relevant field1 and

1

Relevant fields included fire science, emergency management, disaster management and
response, and emergency medicine.
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authored a minimum of three peer reviewed journal articles. The majority of the experts
selected far exceeded these minimum criteria, many panelists having worked in their
fields for over 20 years and a mean of 13.5 years.
Delphi Survey Administration
Following the selection of the expert panel, online surveys were conducted using
SurveyMonkey. The three rounds of questionnaires followed the “ranking-type” Delphi
procedures outlined by Schmidt et al. (2001) consisting of three steps: (1) brainstorming
of important factors and characteristics, (2) narrowing down initial list of factors to the
most important ones, (3) ranking or grading the list of important factors (Okoli and
Pawlowski, 2004). Following this procedure, the first-round open-ended questionnaire
was circulated requesting that the panelists identify and list as many factors and
characteristics contributing to the organizational resilience of EROs as possible (Hsu and
Sandford, 2007). The results of the first questionnaire were collected and assembled into
a complete list of expert-suggested ERO resilience factors. Responses that contained the
same factors with different wording were condensed into one factor in the compiled list.
For example, the responses “being trained in incident command system,” and
“conducting incident command system training” were condensed to “incident command
system training” in the second-round survey. The compiled list was recirculated to the
panel in the second questionnaire in order to determine which of the listed factors were
most important and eliminate factors determined by the experts to be unrelated to ERO
resilience or unimportant (Hsu and Sandford, 2007). Factors’ importance to emergency
response organization resilience were ranked using a five-point Likert scale with one
equaling “not important” and five equaling “very important.” Factors that were
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determined to be “not important” to ERO resilience by 90% or more of the expert panel
were removed following the second-round survey.
Consensus began to develop in the results of the second-round questionnaire and
was evaluated using criteria determined prior to data collection based on
recommendations from relevant Delphi literature (Hsu and Sandford, 2007; Mcleod et al.,
2015; Hasson, Keeney, and McKenna, 2000; Keeney, Hasson, and McKenna, 2006).
Based on the research conducted by Hsu and Sandford (2007) and Mcleod et al. (2015),
the criteria for consensus were defined as: high (80-100% of panelists ranked the factor
as “very important” and “important” or 70%-100 of panelists ranking the factor as “very
important”); medium (70-80% of panelists ranking as “very important” and “important”
or 60-80% ranking as “very important”); low (55-70% ranking “very important” and
“important” or 50-70% ranking “very important”); and none (<55% of ranking “very
important and important”) (Mcleod et al., 2015; Hsu and Sandford, 2007).
Following the second-round questionnaire all factors ranked as “not important” or
“of little importance” with medium and high levels of expert panel consensus were
discarded from the third-round questionnaire. In the third and final questionnaire
panelists were asked to rank the remaining factors again using the same Likert scale.
Prior to evaluating and ranking the factors panelists reviewed the median and mode of the
previous rankings and summarized notes regarding justification for rankings that
panelists were encouraged to make in the previous round.
The results of the third-round questionnaire were analyzed using the consensus
criteria previously discussed. Each factors’ mean, median, and mode, minimum and
maximum ranking, and level of consensus were evaluated (Hsu and Sandford, 2007). The
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outcome of this multi-round consensus-based methodology is an expert-produced,
verified, and ranked list of factors critical to emergency response organization resilience.
1.4 Results
Thirty experts were contacted and asked to participate in the Delphi expert panel,
with twenty experts agreeing to contribute to the study. After the first-round survey, the
expert panel produced a list of 36 factors contributing to emergency response
organization resilience. Following the second-round survey during which the panel
ranked the factors’ importance on a five-point Likert scale, seven factors from the
original list were discarded based on low rankings of importance from the panel. The
remaining 29 factors were re-evaluated by the expert panel in the third round of surveys.
Following the final round, 11 factors ranked as highly important with a high level of
expert consensus, summarized in Table 1.2. An additional eight factors ranked as highly
important with a medium level of consensus (Table 1.3), and 10 factors ranked as
moderately important with low levels of expert consensus (Table 1.4).
Expert Panel Ranking of Resilience Factors with High Consensus
Consensus was determined based on the criteria implemented by Hsu and
Sandford (2007) and Mcleod et al. (2015), with high consensus defined as 80-100% of
panelists ranking a particular factor as “very important” and “important.” Factors were
also determined to have a high consensus of agreement when 70-100% of panelists
identified the factor as “very important” to ERO resilience. Based on these criteria, the 11
factors summarized in Table 1.2 were determined to be important to ERO resilience with
a high level of consensus. The mean importance level of these factors range from 3.82 to

19

4.45 on a 5-point Likert scale with 4 equivalent to “important” and 5 equivalent to “very
important.”
Table 1.2. Ranking of 11 high-consensus resilience factors using a 5-point Likert scale (1
= “not important,” 2 = “of little importance,” 3 = “somewhat important,” 4 = “important,”
5 = “very important”; n=20).

ERO resilience factors identified by expert panel
Ability to effectively identify organizational needs
Establishment and maintenance of clear
communication within organization and externally
Ability to adapt to changing conditions
Ability to establish and maintain clear objectives
Preparedness of organization for disasters and/or
impacts
Effective management of available capital
(financial, human, social)
Engage in relationship building activities prior to
an incident
Availability of and/or access to adequate personnel
and staffing
Knowledge of and access to available resources
Implementation of efficient logistics within
organization
Conduct regular exercises and trainings, providing
opportunity to exercise plans, determine gaps and
opportunities to improve plans

Consensus
Level of
Importance
High (95%)
High (90%)

Mean

High (90%)
High (85%)
High (85%)

4.45
4.15
4.05

High (83%)

3.94

High (83%)

4.18

High (83%)

3.82

High (83%)
High (80%)

3.94
4.15

High (80%)

3.95

4.2
4.4

Expert Panel Ranking of Resilience Factors with Medium Consensus
The seven factors ranked by the expert panel as high importance with a medium
degree of consensus (70-79% agreement) include two resilience factors identified in
previous organizational resilience studies and five factors suggested by the Delphi
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experts (see Table 1.3). Rodin (2014) discusses redundant systems as an organization
having different sources of capacity so that it may continue operations even when
elements or assets are missing. The expert panel also identified redundant systems as
important components of resilient organizations, especially redundancy within operations
and logistics so that emergency response organizations can maintain operational
effectiveness and logistical continuity during and immediately after an impact. Rodin
(2014), Somers (2009), and Lee et al. (2013) all include aspects of awareness, analysis,
and understanding of locally relevant risks and hazards as key to organizational
resilience. The expert panelists supported the importance of situational awareness,
including awareness of local hazards. Through the Delphi survey, the experts also
reached a 72% consensus level on the importance of personal preparedness of emergency
responders, including preparedness of family members.
Table 1.3. Ranking of 7 medium-consensus resilience factors using a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = “not important,” 2 = “of little importance,” 3 = “somewhat important,” 4 =
“important,” 5 = “very important”).
ERO resilience factors identified by expert panel
Availability of and/or access to adequate equipment
to carry out assignments
Redundant systems, redundant operations and
logistics
Standardized operating procedures
Personal preparedness of emergency responders,
including preparedness of family members
Situational awareness to successes, challenges,
lessons learned within organization
Ability to anticipate the "what if" scenarios;
determining proactive actions and decisions
Awareness of locally relevant risks and hazards
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Consensus Level of
Importance
Medium (78%)

Mean

Medium (75%)

3.9

Medium (75%)
Medium (72%)

3.9
3.76

Medium (70%)

3.95

Medium (70%)

3.65

Medium (70%)

3.75

3.76

Expert Panel Ranking of Resilience Factors with Lower and No Consensus
After the third round of surveys were complete, the expert panel had reached no
consensus on seven of the original 36 factors and had reached low consensus on an
additional 11 factors (see Table 1.4 and Table 1.5). All of the no consensus factors were
ranked between 2.6 and 3.29 in importance, indicating that while the experts did not
agree on the factors’ overall ranking, the mean scale of importance was notably lower
than the factors with higher levels of consensus with no panelist giving any factor a
ranking higher than “somewhat important.” The 11 factors that achieved low levels of
consensus from the expert panel had mean rankings of importance higher than the no
consensus group, with mean rankings of importance between 3.47 and 3.84. All of these
low consensus factors displayed widely differing rankings of importance from the expert
panel that did not narrow to closer agreement after three rounds of surveys. These results
indicate that the expert panelists were firmly attached to their original rankings of
importance and were largely unwilling to change their rankings to either higher or lower
levels of importance.

ERO resilience factors identified by expert panel
Access to political and/or jurisdictional support
Participation in mitigation activities to reduce risk prior to
a disaster
Planning (for example: establishment of pre-incident
action plans, pre-plans in place, ability to understand the
steps and procedures required to address likely incidents)
Development and/or implementation of best practices
within organization
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Consensus
Level of
Importance
Low (67%)
Low (65%)

Mean

Low (63%)

3.79

Low (63%)

3.84

3.47
3.7

Motivation, integrity, pride of emergency responders in
organization
Active information and intelligence gathering, seeking
latest information pertaining to training, equipment,
operations
Situational awareness to ongoing risks, hazards, events
outside organization
Maintain current relationships through joint exercises or
trainings, maintain current mutual aid agreements
Emotional stability of emergency responders
Overall health and fitness of emergency responders

Low (61%)

3.53

Low (60%)

3.6

Low (60%)

3.8

Low (56%)

3.65

Low (56%)
Low (56%)

3.65
3.53

Access to financial resources to support emergency
Low (56%)
3.47
response activities
Table 1.4. Ranking of 11 lower-consensus resilience factors using a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = “not important,” 2 = “of little importance,” 3 = “somewhat important,” 4 =
“important,” 5 = “very important”).
Table 1.5. Ranking of 7 no-consensus resilience factors using a 5-point Likert scale (1 =
“not important,” 2 = “of little importance,” 3 = “somewhat important,” 4 = “important,” 5
= “very important”).

ERO resilience factors identified by expert panel
Access to subject matter experts
Effective engagement with all domains of society for profit, non-profit, religious organizations, and
social service organizations
Ability to utilize and follow the principles of
emergency management
ICS training and adherence to NIMS
Previous experience with disaster response
Cross training of staff between different
sections/departments of organization
Use of decentralized command in leadership
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Consensus Level
of Importance
None (39%)
None (39%)

Mean

None (37%)

3.16

None (37%)
None (33%)
None (28%)

3.05
2.82
3.12

None (25%)

2.6

3.06
3.29

1.5 Discussion
The 11 factors ranked by the expert panel as most important to ERO
organizational resilience with high levels of consensus were used to develop a framework
(Figure 1.1) applying organizational resilience principles to emergency response
organizations. These factors highlight key elements of resilience for EROs, and many of
the expert-identified factors are practices that are already included to an extent in
response organization structure and operations. In addition to the 11 most important
factors, the results of the expert panel surveys provide a list of secondary factors that
response organizations may also consider in developing resilience plans (Table 1.3).
Despite the wide variety of environments and communities served by emergency
response organizations, the resiliency framework factors are relevant for many locations
and situations. For example, the ability to adapt to changing conditions is applicable to all
emergency response organizations, whether they are a large city fire department with 400
active firefighters or a part-time rural emergency management director reliant on
volunteers during disasters. This initial checklist of resilience factors provides a starting
place for response organizations to examine their resilience and identify implementable
factors and practices to improve their resilience prior to the next disaster.
Emergency Response Organization Resiliency Framework
The eleven factors that emerged from the Delphi panel survey with high levels of
importance and high degrees of consensus (between 80-95% agreement) provide an
expert-derived list of factors contributing to ERO resilience that can inform resiliencebuilding efforts and planning on the organizational and agency level (see Table 1.2).
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These key resilience factors may be grouped into four areas of focus: resource
management, operations/logistics, planning, and situational awareness (Figure 1.1).
While some of the factors identified through this study support other organizational
resilience research findings, several unique factors were identified that are particularly
relevant to emergency response organizations. The identification of these factors allows
them to be included and emphasized in revisions of plans and procedures for response
organizations.

Figure 1.1. Emergency Response Organization Resiliency Framework.
The results of this study reinforce findings of previous resilience research efforts
as well as contributing new factors specifically focused on ERO resilience. The Delphi
expert panel identified and ranked four factors as important to emergency response
organization resilience that were not identified in other organizational resilience literature
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reviewed for this study. The ability to effectively identify organizational needs was
ranked as important with the highest consensus rate of all factors, 95%. The other factors
uniquely recognized as important for ERO resilience are the ability to establish and
maintain clear objectives, implementation of efficient logistics within the organization,
and effective management of available financial, human, and social capital. The critical
response component of emergency response organizations necessitates the establishment
of sound logistics and clear objectives, which can only be achieved through efficient
management of resources. During large scale disasters resources are likely to be depleted
rapidly, making resource management critically important for ERO’s ability to continue
response operations.
Seven ERO resiliency factors identified by the expert panel support components
of resilience frameworks in existing research. McManus (2008) and Lee et al. (2013)
discuss the establishment and maintenance of clear communication within an
organization and externally with partners and stakeholders as a key element of resilience.
The importance of this factor was supported with the Delphi expert panel who gave it a
mean ranking of 4.4 with 90% consensus. McManus (2008) and Lee et al. (2013) also
identified engagement in relationship building activities prior to an incident and
conducting and participating in regular trainings and exercises as key resilience factors.
The expert panel identified both of these factors as important with mean rankings of 4.18
and 3.95 respectively with high levels of consensus. Rodin (2014) noted the importance
of an organization’s ability to adapt to changing conditions, which the expert panel
strongly agreed with. The expert panel ranked this factor as highly important (a mean
ranking of 4.45) with 90% consensus on the ranking level. The high ranking and
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consensus on this factor are indicative of the expert-acknowledged need for emergency
response organizations to remain flexible, adaptable, and resilient in the face of changes
due to environmental factors, such as climate change, and to human-related factors, such
as changing response types and community needs.
Mallack (1998) identified access to appropriate resources as a key element of
resilience, similar to the expert panels identification of knowledge of and access to
available resources as important with a consensus level of 83%. The resources that are
appropriate to a particular response, and their availability, is likely to vary considerably
based on the type and degree of impact for a disaster, however maintaining the awareness
of and accessibility to resources contributes to organizational preparedness and hence
resilience. Lee et al. (2013) discusses the importance of staff engagement and
involvement, with similarities to the Delphi panel’s identification of availability of and
access to adequate personnel and staffing as a key resilience factor. Personnel and staff
must be engaged in the organization with involvement in organizational activities and
trainings in order to be adequately prepared for serving in an emergency response
capacity during an incident or disaster. The expert panel ranked preparedness of the
organization for disasters and/or impacts as important with a consensus of 85%, echoing
Hollnagel et al.’s (2007) discussion of the ability to respond to various disturbances and
to regular and irregular threats as key to organizational resilience.
Implementing ERO Resiliency Factors
One challenge to implementing improved resiliency measures and practices is the
scarcity of available financial resources to support such efforts. However, the resiliency
factors ranked highest in importance by the expert panelists may be incorporated into
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emergency response organizations’ operations with minimal financial support.
Identification of organizational needs and implementation of efficient logistics are
achievable through improved planning and training of organizations’ leaders. Most
emergency response organizations engage in regular training and exercises both
internally and with exterior mutual aid organizations. These trainings may be
intentionally designed to incorporate resiliency building measures, such as reviewing and
revising disaster response plans, engaging in mutual aid and large scale exercises with
neighboring organizations, reviewing available resources, and practicing clear inter- and
intra-organizational communications. One of the factors with a medium level of
consensus (72%) was the importance of personal preparedness of emergency responders,
including preparedness of family members. As noted by one panelist, emergency
response personnel need to be confident that their homes and families will be safe during
a disaster in order for them to be fully committed to working during an event and not
using vacation or sick time to stay home and care for their families. If organizations
implement personal preparedness training as a component of regular drills and exercises,
they can develop a well-prepared staff whose homes and families will be ready for the
next disaster. Through the development of resiliency-focused and preparedness oriented
trainings and operating procedures, emergency response organizations can take steps to
improve their organizational resiliency and become more prepared for future impacts.
Differences Between ERO Resiliency Framework and Previous Frameworks
Although some factors overlap with previous organizational resilience research
findings, the marked differences in the additional factors address the multitude of
challenges and responsibilities faced by emergency responders during disasters that other
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organizations do not have to cope with. It is especially noteworthy that several of the low
and no consensus factors are aspects of organizational resilience that have been identified
as highly important to resilience in non-emergency response organizations. Access to
subject matter experts was identified by Lee et al. (2013) as a key element in
organizational resilience, however the Delphi expert panel ranked this factor with a mean
of 3.06 (somewhat important) with no consensus, with one panelist recording they
thought the factor was “not at all important” and two experts ranking the factor as “very
important.” Similarly, training in Incident Command Systems (ICS) and adherence to the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) was ranked a mean of 3.05 (somewhat
important) with no consensus and expert panelist rankings from “not at all important” to
“very important.” Training in ICS and NIMS is required for the majority of fire
department, police, emergency medical services, and emergency management personnel
and has been suggested as a key component of improving these organizations’ resilience
during disasters (Waugh 2009).While training in ICS and NIMS may improve
organizations’ interoperability and effective management on emergency scenes, the
expert panelists in this study do not support the importance of this factor in improving
emergency response organizations’ resilience.
Use of decentralized command and cross training staff between different sections
within an organization are identified as key organizational resilience factors in nonemergency response organizations (McManus, 2008; Lee et al., 2013; Mallak, 1998).
However, the expert panel did not reach any consensus regarding their importance to
emergency response organizations with rankings ranging from “not at all important” to
“very important.” The expert panelists’ intentionally diverse backgrounds may contribute
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to their lack of consensus on these factors and future research may focus on identifying
how experts’ backgrounds relate to these factors’ rankings of importance.
One factor’s lack of consensus is particularly notable: the expert panel reached no
consensus on the importance of previous experience with disaster response, with
respondents’ rankings varying from “not at all important” to “very important.” Previous
studies on disaster response cite previous response experience as an important contributor
to resilience to future disasters (McDaniels, 2008), however the expert panel was unable
to reach consensus regarding the factor’s importance for emergency response
organizations. The expert panel’s lack of agreement on these low-consensus factors,
many of which are acknowledged as important to non-response organizations, indicate
the importance of identifying resilience factors applicable to emergency response
organizations, taking into consideration their unique responsibilities and challenges
during a disaster event.
ERO Resilience Contribution to Community Resilience
The ample literature on community-level adaptive capacity, collective action,
organizational resilience, and social capital testifies to the importance of building
resilience, from the local community and organizational level up to the national level
(Adger et al., 2005, Adger, 2003, Keim, 2008, Aldrich, 2012). From an operational
perspective, building resilience and increasing adaptive capacity requires engagement
with organizations, groups, and individuals on a community level in order to promote and
enable collective action focused on resiliency (Adger, 2003, Keim, 2008). Hence,
implementation of strategies and objectives designed to improve organizational resilience
can result in improved community resilience and climate resilience. One example of the
30

operationalized concept of organizational resilience contributing to overall
disaster/climate resilience is the case of restoring port function in the Port of New York
following Superstorm Sandy. The organizational resilience and utilization of social
capital displayed during the activation of the Marine Transportation System Recovery
Unit (MTS-RU) significantly enhanced the Port’s response and recovery capabilities and
contributed to overall community resilience to a climate change-related hazard through
minimization of Port closure time and rapid restoration of full services (Sturgis et al.,
2014, Smythe, 2015).
Limitations of the Study
This study’s geographic focus on the East Coast region was selected in order to
reduce variability in the structure of emergency response organizations, however the
geographic location results in some limitations in the applicability of the study findings.
Given that the expert panel were all selected from the same region, from Maine to the
mid-Atlantic coastal area, the type of hazards considered are limited. Hurricanes, severe
winter storms, and flooding are the primary natural hazards of concern in this region,
while hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and large wildfires are less of a risk. The
focus on certain hazard types and the exclusion of others may lead to bias in the
resiliency factors identified. For example, the expert panel may consider factors
contributing to resiliency to hurricane impacts of greater importance than factors that
would mitigate the damage of wildfires. Thus, the results of this study may be limited in
their applicability to regions with different expected hazards and impacts.
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1.6 Conclusion
The emergency response organizational resilience factors identified through the
Delphi expert panel form a framework on which to build stronger, more resilient response
organizations. The ERO Resiliency Framework identifies factors that are missing in prior
studies focused on non-emergency organizations, demonstrating the importance of
considering the unique resiliency challenges and criteria facing emergency response
organizations. Resiliency frameworks and factors developed for organizations such as
manufacturers and retailers have some applicability to EROs, as demonstrated by the
overlapping factors identified by the expert panel. However, in order to withstand future
impacts and continue providing critical services during and after disaster events,
emergency response organizations need to consider additional resiliency factors as well.
When a large storm is anticipated a retailer or manufacturer can close their business or
move operations to a different site while the affected area sustains the impact and
recovers. Emergency response personnel, in contrast, must report for work during and
after the event, providing critical services to the affected community while their own
homes and families may be at risk. In order to continue delivering emergency services
during and immediately after large events, response organizations must have resilient
plans and operations already implemented. The development of resilience-focused
trainings, engagement in mutual-aid and neighboring agency exercises, and promoting an
organizational emphasis on building resiliency and preparedness will help EROs become
more resilient to the next disaster or disturbance they face. Incorporating the ERO
Resiliency Framework in training, planning, and organizational development can help
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emergency response organizations grow into strong, resilient organizations better
prepared to serve and protect their communities in an age of increasing change.
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Abstract
Purpose: As community and organizational resilience become increasingly important
elements of disaster response and emergency preparedness, examining emergency
response organizations (ERO) leaders’ mental models of resilience provides essential
insights into what they know and value with respect to key resiliency concepts and
approaches to resiliency planning.
Design/methodology: This study examines ERO resilience knowledge and awareness
through the application of mental model analysis of ERO leaders in three coastal New
England municipalities. 41 ERO leaders were interviewed and their default and complete
mental models were assessed for comprehensiveness and balance in comparison to an
expert derived reference model.
Findings: Comparisons of the participants’ default and complete mental models revealed
low default model comprehensiveness scores in all three sites (45%-51%) that increase
notably during researcher-prompted structured questions (84%-90%). In contrast,
participants’ mental model balance scores showed little change between prompted and
unprompted portions of the interview.
Research limitations: The research was limited by the focus on three case study sites.
Future research may expand to a wider scope to include more study areas in a variety of
risk environments, such as tornado-prone regions and areas vulnerable to wildfires.
Practical implications: The identification and description of ERO leaders’ mental
models highlights the gaps and inaccuracies in the participant’s mental models.
Additionally, the results indicate the large shifts that can occur in ERO leader’s mental
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models concerning resilience due to discussion and input from others. The results of this
mental model assessment provide insights that can inform future emergency response
resilience education and planning initiatives in addition to suggesting areas for future
research.
Originality: This research applies mental model methods to the study of ERO resilience
in order to address the current gap in academic literature. The study results also suggest
new areas for research and inquiry pertaining to successful application of resiliency
initiatives in the emergency response community.
Key words: emergency response organization, resilience, mental model methods
Paper type: Research paper
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2.1 Introduction
Emergency response organizations (EROs) are a critical component of communities’
disaster response, emergency preparedness, and resilience planning efforts. Although
there are many current research efforts focusing on community and organizational
resilience (Somers, 2009; Rodin, 2014; Lee et al., 2013; Mallak, 1998; McManus et al.,
2008), little research focuses specifically on resilience in EROs. In order to build
communities that are ready to face the challenges of a rapidly changing world with
increasing climate-related risks and hazards, EROs must become fully involved in
resiliency-building and planning initiatives. This study focuses on the five EROs
identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the Emergency Services
Sector-Specific Plan: fire, police and law enforcement, emergency medical services,
emergency management agencies, and public works departments (Thompson, J. and
Durkovich, 2015). These five key response organizations provide essential emergency
and routine life-safety services to their communities in day-to-day operations, and serve
as first responders during large scale incidents or disasters such as hurricanes, blizzards,
or terrorist attacks. Due to their roles in routine operations as well as disaster events,
incorporating EROs in resiliency planning initiatives can contribute to community
resilience by ensuring the continued provision of essential life-safety services during any
incident or impact (Lee et al., 2013). This study focuses on identifying and describing
ERO leaders’ mental models of resiliency within their organizations and identifies the
components of resilience they value most.
This study examines ERO resilience understanding and awareness through the
application of mental model analysis of ERO leaders in three coastal New England
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towns, Westerly, Rhode Island, West Haven, Connecticut, and Stratford, Connecticut.
Mental models are an “individual’s internal representation of an external problem or
phenomenon,” and as such offer a unique perspective on the world view and
understanding each person brings to their decision-making, behavior, and attitudes
(Smythe and Thompson, 2015; Gentner and Stevens, 1983). As community and
organizational resilience become increasingly important elements of disaster response
and emergency preparedness, understanding ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience
provide important insights into their knowledge of key resiliency concepts and approach
to resiliency planning. This study defines resilience as the “capacity of any entity – an
individual, a community, or an organization – to prepare for disruptions, to recover from
shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience” (Rodin, 2014).
Current literature provides a wide variety of definitions for “resilience,” however Rodin’s
definition was selected based on a thorough literature review. This article forms one
section of a larger mixed-methods study that developed an expert derived and verified
ERO Resiliency Framework (see Manuscript 1), applied information developed from the
Framework to build an expert mental model of ERO resilience, and analyzed mental
models of ERO leaders in the field to identify gaps and differences in leaders’ mental
models compared to the expert mental model.
The mental models of ERO leaders were analyzed using the concepts of mental
model “comprehensiveness” and “balance” developed by Smythe and Thompson (2015)
in order to develop an understanding of the leaders’ primary focuses and knowledge
areas. Moreover, this study examined the discrepancies between the ERO leaders’ models
and the expert model. The results of this analysis provide important insights into ERO
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leaders’ current understanding and approach to resilience, which may inform future
resiliency education, policy, and planning efforts.
2.2 Resilience in Emergency Response Organizations
As the field of community and organizational resilience attracts increasing
academic and governmental attention, the lack of research focusing on ERO resilience is
notable. Current organizational resilience literature emphasizes the increasing importance
of resilience to all organizations and examines case studies of non-profit organizations,
retailers, manufacturers, technology suppliers, public utilities, and private contractors
(Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Lee et al., 2013; McManus et al., 2008). Although these
studies provide recommendations and guidelines for multiple types of organizations,
none of them provide guidance for emergency response organizations. Defining the roles
EROs play in communities and their responsibilities is essential to understanding their
importance in resiliency efforts. Fire departments are responsible for providing fire
suppression, rescue operations, hazardous material response, and incident command in
addition to other functions. Police departments serve as the law enforcement agency,
responsible for maintaining security, managing people and traffic, and responding to
critical violent incidents. Emergency medical services may be provided by fire
departments, private companies, or municipal departments and are responsible for
providing medical response in the out-of-hospital setting. Emergency management
agencies serve a key function as the management organization responsible for planning,
preparing, mitigating, and responding to natural disasters or human-caused incidents.
Public works departments also serve an essential emergency response function by
clearing roads of snow, fallen trees, or debris, securing water, gas, and electrical utilities
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that may be damaged, and working in coordination with the previously listed response
organizations to access individuals in need of assistance. Communities rely on the critical
life-safety services provided by EROs on a daily basis as well as during extreme disaster
events; thus, the resilience of EROs within a community are an essential component of
improved community resilience. However, EROs face unique challenges in improving
resilience that other organizations such as retailers and manufacturers do not encounter.
For example, emergency responders cannot move personnel and equipment and relocate
to areas outside the impact zone until the disaster has passed as is recommended for
organizations such as manufacturers and non-profits (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). Nor
can emergency response personnel work remotely from home or other secure locations.
Due to the nature of the critical services provided, emergency responders must report for
duty when other employees may be advised to shelter at home or in emergency shelters.
Thus, resilience-building factors applicable to EROs must take into consideration the
unique situations and challenges facing emergency responders during disaster events and
their fundamental role in daily emergency operations.
The ERO Resiliency Framework was developed to address the lack of EROspecific resiliency strategies in current literature and to produce recommendations
directly applicable and translatable to ERO practitioners working in communities (see
Manuscript 1). The Framework outlines the eleven key resilience factors in four areas of
focus: resource management, operations/logistics, planning, and situational awareness.
The Framework was developed through a Delphi-method survey of emergency
response experts including highly experienced field practitioners, academic researchers,
and administrative and policy professionals. Manuscript 1 describes the complete Delphi
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study and findings resulting in the development of the ERO Resiliency Framework.
Identifying key factors contributing to ERO resilience is essential to creating translatable
and actionable resilience-building recommendations that EROs may apply to their plans,
procedures, and training to begin the process of improving their resilience. In order to be
most effective in developing ERO resilience-building initiatives and plans, it is essential
to understand ERO leaders’ mental models of their organizations’ resilience.
2.3 Mental Models Applied to EROs
A mental model is “an individual’s internal cognitive representation of a realworld or hypothetical domain, problem, or phenomenon” and forms the basis of the
individual’s world view, impacting their behavior, decision making, communication, and
reasoning (Gentner and Stevens, 1983; Smythe and Thompson, 2015; Jones et al., 2011;
Ladosz, 2015). The concept of mental models was originally proposed by the
psychologist Kenneth Craik (1943), who suggested that the nature of human thought was
the manipulation of internal representations and understanding of the world. Craik’s
theory was expanded by Johnson-Laird (1980) in work proposing that mental models
carried important lessons for cognitive science, processing, and reasoning. Mental models
are highly dynamic and although they do not change easily, models may adapt to
changing circumstances and evolve over time (Jones et al., 2011). The introduction of
new information, further training, or exposure to new experiences may alter individuals’
mental models, reshaping them or adding additional details. Mental model analysis, a
method that extracts participants’ cognitive conceptualizations about a specific subject,
form a key component of research into individuals’ knowledge, beliefs, values, and
perceptions of the world and is especially applicable to research focused on
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understanding how individuals approach and solve problems, make decisions, and
perceive their surroundings (Hulst, 2012; Smythe and Thompson, 2015; Ladosz, 2015).
Use of mental model analysis allows researchers to gain important insight into how
individuals “internally represent complex, dynamic systems and how these
representations change over time” (Jones et al., 2011). Better understanding of how
individuals conceive of and view particular practices, concepts, and problems may be
used in a wide variety of ways, including enhanced decision making, development of
better management policies, and improved communication (Zaksek and Arvai, 2004;
Stone-Jovicich et al., 2011, Jones et al., 2011). Mental model analysis methods have been
successfully applied to a variety of disciplines including coastal zone and coastal
ecosystem management (Hulst, 2012; Smythe and Thompson, 2015), water use and
management (Mathevet et al., 2011, Stone-Jovicich et al., 2011, Kolkman and van der
Veen, 2005), flood risk management (Wood et al., 2012), natural resource management
(Zaksek and Arvai, 2004), risk communication (Morgan et al., 2002), and volunteer
tourism (Ladosz, 2015).
Although mental model analysis provides unique insights into individuals’
understandings and perceptions, it also presents challenges. It may be difficult to
differentiate and elicit the mental models that subjects genuinely rely on to make
decisions and take actions rather than the mental models that they may externally
“espouse” but not actually use in their internal decision making and conceptualization
process (Jones et al., 2011). It is also possible that the mental models elicited during the
study may be inaccurate and/or incomplete due to the exclusion of some stakeholders or
incomplete or inaccurate mental models of individuals interviewed (Jones et al., 2011).
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Mental models must be viewed as “functional rather than complete or accurate
representations of reality” due to the fact that by nature mental models are a simplified
representation of reality (Jones et al., 2011). Additionally, due to cognitive limitations, it
may not be “possible nor desirable to represent in a mental model every detail that may
be found in reality” (Jones et al., 2011; Smythe and Thompson, 2015; Ladosz, 2015). In
spite of the incomplete representation of reality obtained through mental model research,
it remains a valuable methodological tool for assessing individuals’ internal
understandings and cognitive representations of the outside world (Jones et al., 2011).
Implementing resilience in EROs is an inherently complex goal involving
identifying and changing outdated attitudes and traditions, developing new habits and
methods of approaching organizational responsibilities, and engaging diverse
stakeholders in new approaches to daily activities as well as disaster events. The use of
mental model analysis is particularly appropriate for the purposes of this research. The
identification of ERO leaders’ mental models is essential to fully understanding their
current comprehension and knowledge of resilience prior to implementing resiliencebuilding initiatives. Understanding the mental models of the numerous different
individuals involved in community emergency response helps identify gaps in
knowledge, responders’ varying levels of understanding pertaining to resilience and risk,
and their attitudes, preferences, and values (Mathevet et al., 2011; Smythe and
Thompson, 2015; Jones et al., 2011). Identifying mental models and making them
explicit can help both trainers and planners adapt and adjust existing plans and education
programs and develop new trainings designed to respond to EROs current mental models.
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Emergency response leaders’ ability to understand the multiple components of
ERO resilience is essential in order for them to implement resilience as an organizational
goal and incorporate resiliency factors in trainings, planning, and operations. Hence,
assessing ERO leaders’ current mental models of resilience and identifying gaps in
knowledge and understanding contributes to the success of their department’s education,
trainings, and planning efforts. Through the use of mental model interviews and analysis,
a comprehensive view of ERO leaders’ varying mental models regarding their
organizations’ resilience emerge.
2.4 Methodology
This study applied a comparative case study approach using mental model
methodology to assess ERO leaders’ conceptualization and understanding of resilience in
three case study sites in coastal southern New England: Westerly, Rhode Island, West
Haven, Connecticut, and Stratford, Connecticut. These sites were selected based on their
similarities and thus comparability. Specifically, each site is a mid-sized (population
23,000-54,500 according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 2011)) coastal community that
sustained impact and damages from Superstorm Sandy (2012), has taken identifiable
steps towards reducing future impacts of major storms, and has municipal-based
emergency services including fire departments, police departments, emergency medical
services (EMS), emergency management agencies (EMA), and public works
departments. Interview subjects were recruited from each ERO based on their leadership
role within the organizations. A total of 41 ERO leaders were interviewed for this
research, 15 in Westerly, 10 in West Haven, and 16 in Stratford, providing a total
population sample of ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience in the three study sites.
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The methods used in this study are based on the mental model methodology
outlined by Morgan et al. (2002) consisting of four steps: (1) developing the “reference
model,” an expert model of ERO resilience, (2) conducting mental model interviews with
leaders in each of the five identified EROs in the selected study locations, (3)
transcribing, coding, and analyzing the interview transcripts, and (4) comparing
interviewees’ mental models with the reference model (Smythe and Thompson, 2015;
Morgan et al., 2002). This methodological framework provides the foundation in the
application of previously tested and verified methods to a new area of inquiry, emergency
response leaders’ mental models of resilience.
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Figure 2.1. Reference ERO resilience model.

The development of the reference model, the expert model of ERO resilience, was
based on the key components of organizational resilience identified through a review of
current academic literature and expanded based on the results of the Delphi study of
emergency response experts described in Manuscript 1. The core components of the
reference model (planning, resource management, situational awareness, and
operations/logistics, see Figure 2.1) are identified as essential aspects of organizational
resilience in multiple studies and their relevance to EROs was confirmed through the
Delphi study described in Manuscript 1 (Rodin, 2014; Mallak, 1998; Somers, 2009; Lee
et al., 2013; McManus et al., 2008). The Delphi study also contributed additional details
to the reference model that focused on emergency response organizations’ resilience. The
literature reviewed in this study does not address the specific factors relevant to ERO
resilience, hence the expert insights obtained through the Delphi portion of this research
add depth to the expert model. The combination of literature-derived and expert-derived
components in the development of the expert model provides a more comprehensive
reference model including both the academic literature and expert practitioner input (see
Figure 2.1). The reference model formed the basis for the development of the interview
instrument and was reviewed for comprehensiveness by two resilience experts and two
ERO leaders who were excluded from study inclusion based on their geographic location.
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Figure 2.2: The Emergency Response Organizational (ERO) Resiliency Framework,
including the core components of ERO resilience.
Mental model interviews were conducted using the “funnel design” and “prompting”
approach outlined by Morgan et al. (2002) and applied by Smythe and Thompson (2015).
Each interview began with broad open-ended questions and then narrowed to a series of
researcher-prompted questions. The initial questions were designed to be intentionally
broad in order to elicit the participants’ unprompted thoughts regarding resilience in their
organizations with minimal influence from the interviewer. This approach allows a
researcher to learn what is most salient to the interviewee. Initial phase questions such as
“Could you tell me about resilience in your organization?” were followed up with
questions such as “Could you tell me more about ____?” or “Could you explain that?”
with the intention of the participant leading the direction and focus of the conversation.
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After the broad participant-led phase of the interview, the interviewer led the
conversation with focus area-specific questions such as “What can you tell me about
partnerships in your organization?” and “Does your organization engage in mutual aid
exercises?” The core component-specific questions were worded the same in each
interview and addressed all primary components of the reference model. Importantly,
prompted questions were only used to bring up topics that had not been addressed by the
interviewee in the first participant-led stage of the interview. Answers were coded to
indicate whether the information was provided without prompting or only after
prompting. All 41 interviews were conducted in person by the lead researcher in a
consistent manner utilizing the same interview instrument to ensure comprehensiveness
and consistency of each interview. Each interview was recorded with the participants’
written permission for subsequent transcription.
Following the completion of the interview stage, transcribed interviews were coded
and analyzed using NVivo qualitative data analysis software to assist in comparisons of
mental models between individual participants and with the reference model (Smythe and
Thompson, 2015; Thompson, 2005). Using methods outlined by Morgan et al. (2002), the
code book was developed based on the reference model with each model node, a word or
phrase summarizing the concept or subject being discussed, included in the code book
(Morgan et al., 2002; Hulst, 2012; Smythe and Thompson, 2015). The developed code
book was tested with a researcher familiar with the subject area and a professional in the
emergency response and management field to ensure consistency in coding and all
transcribed interviews were then coded by the lead researcher.
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Coding was conducted based on the “fracturing” approach (Bazeley and Jackson,
2013) such that individual topics or concepts were coded each time they were raised
during the interview in order to ensure accurate quantitative analysis of the subjects’
mental models. Coding also included recording whether the content was discussed during
the initial “unprompted” or second “prompted” phases of the interview (Smythe and
Thompson, 2015). The resulting interview coding was analyzed using the methodology
developed by Smythe and Thompson (2015) to visualize and compare participants’
mental model comprehensiveness and balance. In order to assess and compare mental
model comprehensiveness and balance, each interviewees’ responses were summarized to
identify the presence or absence (whether the participant had identified each of the
possible nodes in the reference model) and repetition (the number of times a participant
mentioned each node) (Smythe and Thompson, 2015). The number of prompted and
unprompted mentions of each node were also recorded in each participant summary. The
results of all 41 participant summaries were aggregated within the four main focus areas
of the reference model: planning, resource management, situational awareness, and
operations/logistics.
In order to assess the mental model comprehensiveness and balance of each
participant and identify participants’ “default” and “complete” models, the analysis
methods developed by Smythe and Thompson (2015) were applied to the results of the
interview coding summaries (Table 2.1). Mental model comprehensiveness was
measured by comparing the percentage of nodes, corresponding to concepts, in the
reference model the participants identified with and without prompting, forming their
“default” (unprompted) and “complete” (prompted) mental models. Participants’ mental
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model balance was determined based on the number of times a node in the reference
model was mentioned during the interview, both in the unprompted and prompted
portions of the interview (Smythe and Thompson, 2015). Thus, participants’ default
(unprompted) model provides important insights into the aspects and components of
resilience with which they are most familiar or most comfortable, or the areas that they
feel are most important and the top priority. The complete (prompted) model is larger and
includes topics or content that the participant feels are correct or valid but that they may
be less knowledgeable about or believe to be less important and thus not think of until
prompted by the researcher (Smythe and Thompson, 2015).
Table 2.1. Mental model measure definitions (Smythe and Thompson, 2015).
Mental model measure
Default model
Complete model
Mental model
comprehensiveness
Mental model balance

Definition
Model derived from unprompted open-ended section of
interview
Model derived from complete interview (prompted and
unprompted)
Extent to which interviewees’ mental models included
reference model components
Extent to which interviewees’ mental model focuses
equally across four reference model focus areas

This research focused on identifying and describing ERO leaders’ mental models
brings to light the gaps in the participant’s mental models as well as the wide variety of
mental models held by individuals within the same department and the same community.
Assessment of the comprehensiveness and balance of individuals’ mental models
highlights areas of strength as well as gaps in knowledge and understanding. In addition,
the results of this study show the shifts that can occur in mental models due to discussion
and input from others, such as the prompting questions of the researcher. The results of
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this mental model assessment provide insights to inform future emergency response
resilience education and planning initiatives in addition to suggesting areas for future
research.
2.5 Results
The mental models of 41 ERO leaders were analyzed to identify the components,
comprehensiveness, and balance of their mental models of resilience within their
organizations. The results of the interview coding analysis were compared between the
three case study sites and between organizations to fully understand the differences and
similarities between individuals’ and organizations’ mental model comprehensiveness
and balance. The findings of this study provide important insights into the application of
resiliency concepts within the emergency response field.
The average complete comprehensiveness scores for all ERO leaders across all
three case study sites were very similar with West Haven having the lowest (84%), and
Stratford (89%) and Westerly (90%). Similarly, the sites’ default comprehensiveness
scores were also close: (West Haven 45%, Westerly 49%, and Stratford 51%). As can be
seen, however, there was a large difference between all locations’ default and complete
scores (see Table 2.2). Westerly participants had the lowest complete model
comprehensiveness scores for situational awareness (81%) and resource management
(89%) with higher scores in planning (94%) and operations/logistics (95%). Stratford
participants had similar complete model comprehensiveness scores with lower scores in
situational awareness (78%) and resource management (87%) and higher scores in
planning (92%) and operations/logistics (97%). West Haven participants had the lowest
scores of the three sites across all focus areas with situational awareness (70%) and
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resource management (84%) lower than operations/logistics (89%) and planning (90%).
All three sites had low default model comprehensiveness scores ranging from 36% (West
Haven, situational awareness) to 57% (Stratford, resource management). As Table 2.2
illustrates, the average interviewee in each of the three case study sites increased their
mental model comprehensiveness notably between their default and complete models,
demonstrating how their focus and what they determined to be of greatest importance
was far narrower than their full understanding that was revealed through prompting by
the researcher-led structured questions.
Table 2.2. Summary results of mental model comprehensiveness for three case study
sites (D = default, C = complete).
Site

Total
Comp.
Score

Westerly 90%
(n=15)
West
84%
Haven
(n=10)
Stratford 89%
(n=16)

Resource
Management

Planning

Operations /
Logistics

Situational
Awareness

D

C

D

C

D

C

D

C

51%

89%

48%

94%

50%

95%

46%

81%

54%

84%

44%

90%

35%

89%

36%

70%

57%

87%

52%

92%

51%

97%

46%

78%

In contrast to their mental model comprehensiveness scores, most participants’
mental model balance scores shifted very little between their default and complete
models (see Table 2.3). The site with the greatest shift between default and complete
model balance was West Haven with 1% to 3% increases in balance varying between
focus areas. Both Westerly and Stratford show minor increases in model balance between
default and complete models, between 1% and 2% increases depending on focus area.
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Table 2.3. Summary results of mental model balance for three case study sites (D =
default, C = complete).
Site

Total
Resource
Planning
Balance Management
Score
D
C
D
C

Westerly
(n=15)
95%
West
Haven
(n=10)
90%
Stratford
(n=16)
95%

Operations /
Logistics

Situational
Awareness

D

C

D

C

20%

22%

24%

26%

17%

18%

28%

29%

19%

20%

17%

18%

17%

20%

30%

32%

18%

19%

22%

24%

20%

22%

29%

30%

The results of mental model comprehensiveness and balance analysis based on
type of ERO are displayed in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. In order to simplify the
comparison of mental models between locations, summarized results of mental model
comprehensiveness and balance for each case study site are presented in Table 2.4. The
default model comprehensiveness of the fire department leaders (53%) was very similar
to the comprehensiveness of police (54%), emergency medical services (EMS) (53%),
and emergency management agency staff (51%), with department of public works (DPW)
personnel having the lowest default model score (33%). The complete model
comprehensiveness scores are also tightly grouped for fire (89%), police (90%), EMS
(91%), and EMA (91%), with DPW showing significant increase but still holding the
lowest score (77%). When analyzed by ERO, participants’ show similar low changes in
mental model balance score ranging from increases of 1-10%. The notable exception is
department of public works personnel (DPW), who improved their default model balance
score of 59% to 95% following structured-interview prompting, a 36% increase.
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Table 2.4. Summary results of mental model comprehensiveness and balance by case
study site.
Site

Westerly
West
Haven
Stratford

Mental Model
Comprehensiveness
Default Complete Change
between
49%
90%
41%

Mental Model Balance

42%
51%

83%
89%

83%
88%

41%
37%

Default Complete Change
between
89%
95%
6%
90%
95%

7%
6%

Table 2.5. Summary results of mental model comprehensiveness and balance by ERO.
ERO

Fire
Police
EMS
DPW
EMA

Mental Model
Comprehensiveness
Default Complete Change
between
53%
89%
36%
54%
90%
36%
53%
91%
38%
33%
77%
44%
51%
91%
40%

Mental Model Balance
Default
88%
84%
89%
59%
84%

Complete Change
between
93%
5%
94%
10%
90%
1%
95%
36%
93%
9%

The varying default and complete model scores examined by core component for
each ERO reveal organizational strengths and gaps in knowledge or comfort levels. Fire,
police, EMS, and EMA leaders had default model scores within a similar range across all
four areas of focus (47-62%). However, DPW personnel had the lowest default model
scores for planning (30%), operations/logistics (23%) and situational awareness (29%).
DPW also had the lowest complete model score with 61% for situational awareness.
While there was notable variability within fire, police, EMS, and EMA complete model
scores in different focus areas, the complete comprehensiveness scores had a much
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smaller range, from 79% to 99%. The marked increases in model comprehensiveness
between default and complete models are notable in all five EROs analyzed.
Table 2.6. Summary results of mental model comprehensiveness by ERO (D = default, C
= complete).
ERO
Fire
(n=13)
Police
(n=8)
EMS
(n=8)
DPW
(n=5)
EMA
(n=7)

Resource
Management
D
C

Planning
C

Operations /
Logistics
D
C

Situational
Awareness
D
C

D

58%

87%

53%

93%

51% 96%

48%

80%

62%

88%

53%

98%

57% 96%

47%

79%

49%

93%

52%

90%

58% 96%

54%

84%

49%

81%

30%

82%

23% 83%

29%

61%

49%

87%

54%

97%

46% 99%

56%

83%

In order to visualize the changes in default and complete model
comprehensiveness, radar graphs were made displaying the shifts in focus and balance
for each ERO (Figure 2.3). The similar mental model balance between the default and
complete model is clear for fire, police, EMS, and EMA, and the notable shift in the
DPW’s balance between default and complete results in a balance comparable to the
other EROs. The significant increase in comprehensiveness between the default and
complete models are clearly visible for fire, police, EMS, and EMA with their
comprehensiveness scores reaching from 89% to 91%. The DPW’s default
comprehensiveness started much lower than the other EROs (33%) and shows
noteworthy increase to a complete model score of 77%, however the DPW complete
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score remains behind the complete score of the other four EROs. The implications and
potential causes of this difference will be discussed in the following section.
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Figure 2.3. Mental model comprehensiveness compared by average of ERO participants.
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2.6 Discussion
The results of this study reveal some key considerations and essential insights into
ERO leaders’ understanding of resilience in their organizations. Shifts and changes in the
participants’ mental model comprehensiveness between the unprompted default and
prompted complete model illustrate differences in what the ERO leaders know on a
broader scale and what they value and focus on most. Prompts, in this study the
researcher’s structured questions, can expand participants’ mental models, highlighting
the participants’ areas of greatest attention and comfort through the unprompted portion
of the interview and contrasting it with their wider field of knowledge. Differences
between case study sites’ default and complete models, as well as differences between
EROs models, provide insights about current approaches to resilience as well as areas of
greater value, knowledge, and comfort for the participants.
Comparing Mental Model Comprehensiveness
Results suggest that fire, police, EMS, and EMA are more familiar with the
concept and details of ERO resilience, as indicated by their higher default model
comprehensiveness compared with the DPW participants. The relatively high default
mental model balance across the three case study sites and between EROs indicates that
the four core components are all areas in which the participants have a base level of
comfort or experience as they were able to address nodes of the reference model in all
core component areas. One notable exception is the DPW participants, who had the
lowest default model comprehensiveness and balance scores.
During interviews, DPW leaders frequently noted that they had not been included
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in previous emergency planning initiatives within their communities and many did not
consider themselves knowledgeable enough about resilience to speak with authority on
the subject. Of the five DPW personnel interviewed, three referred the researcher to fire
chiefs, EMA leaders, or police chiefs for more information about resilience in their
communities. As the results indicate, the DPW participants increased their mental model
comprehensiveness by 44% between the default and complete model, indicating that they
had more extensive understanding when reminded about the broader view of resilience
through the researcher’s prompts. As previously described, DPW personnel and
equipment serve a critical function in responding to natural disasters by clearing roads
and providing access so fire, police, and EMS can reach individuals in need of assistance.
One DPW director noted, “we are good at managing our equipment and our staff, I can
tell you exactly how many trucks and plows and chainsaws I have and I know how many
people I need to call in for a snowstorm, but I have no idea what the town’s plan is if a
hurricane is coming our way.” This comfort with resource management and lack of
knowledge regarding planning and operations is reflected in the mental model
comprehensiveness of the DPW participants interviewed.
The DPW leaders’ default comprehensiveness score was 49%, the same as EMS
and EMA leaders, but their default scores for the other three core components were
notably lower than their counterparts in fire, police, EMS, and EMA. While prompting
from the researcher’s questions resulted in large increases in their comprehensiveness
levels, DPW leaders still had the lowest complete mental model comprehensiveness score
with 77%. Although DPW serves as an important component of the emergency
preparedness and response community, their primary daily operational focus is on
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transportation and infrastructure, not the life safety and critical response work that fire,
police, and EMS engage in on a daily basis. As such, some of the concepts in the
reference model are less familiar to DPW personnel, but with prompting the DPW
participants were willing and able to talk about the areas of focus with greater
comprehensiveness and balance. DPW personnel are an essential component of
communities’ emergency preparedness and response resources and must be included in
future planning and resilience knowledge sharing events or groups in order to bridge the
gap between their daily operational focus and emergency response function.
Catalyzing Events and Changing Times Impacting Mental Models
The core component that received the highest default balance scores was
situational awareness (Westerly 28%, Stratford 29%, and West Haven 30%). The
situational awareness focus area included the nodes corresponding to the opioid crisis and
active shooter events, impacting both the balance and comprehensiveness scores of
participants. Increasing numbers of opioid overdoses place a significant demand on fire,
EMS, and police departments’ financial and personnel resources and 40% of participants
unprompted identified the opioid crisis as a concern for their organization. Active shooter
situations were also in the forefront of participants’ minds due to the prevalence of mass
casualty active shooter incidents in 2017-2018, with 51% of interviewees describing
recent active shooter trainings or drills their organizations participated in within the past
year. The prevalence and public attention drawn to both the opioid crisis and active
shooter scenarios are reflected in the higher default mental model comprehensiveness and
balance of ERO leaders in these case study sites. In addition to impacting the results of
this research, the opioid crisis and active shooter incidents provide an example of how
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highly public and catalyzing events can have an influence on individuals’ unprompted
default mental models and shift focus away from low probability-high consequence
events such as natural disasters.
The increases in mental model comprehensiveness displayed by ERO leaders in
all three case study sites suggest that the leaders are willing and able to change their
mental model of resilience to be more inclusive of all core components of ERO
resilience. Many participants stated that their organizations were resistant to change and
old traditions and practices were difficult to alter, but 95% (38 of the 41 interviewees)
said that their organizations had to keep up with changing times and new ideas and
innovations. One fire chief stated, “this isn’t the world we faced as firefighters 30 or 40
years ago. The world has changed and we need to change with it to keep providing our
communities the best services we can.” Participants across all five organizations
expressed interest in engaging in additional resilience training and education and
incorporating resilience principles into their plans and protocols. In addition, ERO
leaders in all three case study sites invited the researcher back upon the completion of
this study to share research results and recommendations for their organizations.
Mental Models Motivating Change
The large differences in mental model comprehensiveness between default and
complete models in all three case study sites and across all five EROs suggests that there
is an opportunity to bridge the gaps in ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience in their
organizations. Default mental models were relatively balanced with participants
addressing nodes in all four core component areas, but participants primarily focused on
the large ideas and aspects of resilience forming the central nodes of the reference model.
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With prompting, the participants’ mental models expanded to include more nodes in each
core component area, displaying greater knowledge of details relevant to each core
component. This shift of the participants’ mental models indicates that with prompting,
ERO leaders are more comprehensive in their approach to resiliency and thus may
address resilience with greater thoroughness in planning efforts and training scenarios.
Shifts in ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience may also provide opportunities
for motivating change within the emergency response community. Research on cultural
models, similar to mental model studies, supports the importance of cultural knowledge
in motivating individuals to take action (Strauss, 1992; Holland and Quinn, 1987;
Paolisso, 2002). The results of this study describing the comprehensiveness and balance
of participants’ mental models also provides insights on the broader cultural knowledge
of resilience in emergency response organizations. An improved understanding of these
critical organizations’ mental and cultural models can guide future efforts to motivate
action and set goals on an organizational and community level.
2.7 Conclusion
The understanding of ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience gained through
this research provide insights and recommendations for future applications of resiliencybuilding initiatives in an emergency response context. ERO leaders have notably
balanced and comprehensive default models of resilience and they are familiar with the
core ERO resiliency components of resource management, planning, operations/logistics,
and situational awareness. In addition, the participants saw the four core components as
nearly equally important with small levels of variation in comprehensiveness or balance
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between components in both their default and complete models. ERO leaders are also
willing and able to change their mental models of resilience with prompting regarding the
various components of resilience. Thus, it is recommended that resilience initiatives
actively recruit and involve leaders from emergency response organizations in planning
projects and outreach efforts. Emergency responders strongly adhere to time-honored
traditions and may be resistant to change, but ERO leaders acknowledge that the world is
changing around them and they must proactively engage in efforts to incorporate new
concepts, such as resilience, in their plans, policies, and response operations. Additional
research is needed to identify the best methods for teaching resilience principles and
strategies to emergency responders. A good initial step is encouraging ERO leaders to get
involved with current community emergency planning initiatives and proactively
discussing the role of resilience in their organizations.
One important finding of this study is the noted differences between DPW leaders
and research participants from fire, police, EMS, and EMA organizations. Although
DPW leaders’ focus in their day-to-day operations is not on the critical life-safety
scenarios and events that fire, police, and EMS face on a daily basis, they are an
important resource and contributor in emergency response to large-scale events,
especially natural disasters. As such, DPW needs to be included in the emergency
planning process and invited to participate in trainings and educational opportunities.
Incorporating DPW assets and staff during exercises serves as a way to familiarize fire,
police, EMS, and EMA leaders and personnel with the capabilities and equipment of their
DPW colleagues and provides an opportunity for DPW leaders to participate in
emergency planning and scenario-based training. In order to provide the best possible
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response and remain resilient during potential impacts from disasters, all emergency
response organizations must work together and build their organizational resilience
cooperatively.
Gaps in ERO leaders’ mental models also provide an opportunity to tailor
education, training, and outreach efforts to address aspects of resilience with which they
are less familiar and comfortable. Most emergency response departments engage in
regular training, drills, and continued education, thus incorporating resilience training and
best practices into pre-scheduled drills or classes. In order for EROs to proactively
include resilience factors and strategies in their plans and operations, it is vital to clearly
demonstrate how such factors and strategies will improve their ability to safely and
successfully carry out their critical life-safety missions during times of disaster. Building
resilient EROs is an essential component in the development of resilient communities,
and the results of this research highlight key areas to focus future education and planning
efforts as well as suggesting areas for future research.
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Letter

Resilient Response in an Age of Change: Emergency Response Organizations’ Resilience
in Times of Disaster
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH: INTERVIEW
You have been invited to take part in a research project described below. The researcher
will explain the project to you in detail. You should feel free to ask questions. If you have
more questions later, Clara Decerbo, the graduate researcher conducting this study, can
be reached at 802-299-5339 to discuss them with you. The total maximum time required
for participation in this study is 1.5 hours, the maximum duration of the interview. In
order to participate in this study you must be over 18 years old and of sound mind. This
research project is conducted under the supervision of Principal Investigator Dr. Robert
Thompson.
Description of the project:
This research will use data obtained through this interview to evaluate the resilience of
emergency response organizations (EROs) during disasters. The organizations focused on
in this study include fire departments, police departments, emergency medical services,
departments of public works, and emergency management agencies. The results of this
study will be used to develop guidelines and recommendations for improving the
resilience of EROs in the United States and internationally.
What will be done:
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be interviewed regarding your opinions
and experiences relating to emergency response organizations’ resilience to disasters. The
interview will last 45 to 90 minutes and will be recorded with your permission. The only
additional involvement that may be asked of you would be a brief follow-up conducted
by the researcher within 1 year of the initial interview to clarify any responses.
Risks or discomfort:
There is minimal risk in participating in this study.
Benefits of this study:
This study will benefit emergency response organizations and emergency response
personnel who must continue providing critical services during and immediately after
disruptive and destructive disasters. The results of this study will also benefit
communities negatively affected by disasters through improved resilience of their
emergency response organizations.
Confidentiality:
Names of participants will not be used and your participation and information shared in
this study is confidential. None of the information will identify you by name. All written
records will be stored in a locked file cabinet in the Coastal Institute Kingston at the
University of Rhode Island. Scientific reports and academic presentations of this study
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will be based on group data and will not identify you or any individual as being in this
project. Data will be destroyed three years after the completion of the study.
In case there is any injury to the subject:
This study is not expected to cause any injury. If this study causes you any injury, you
should write or call the office of the Vice President for Research, 70 Lower College
Road, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-4328.
Decision to quit at any time:
The decision to take part in this study is completely voluntary. If you decide to take part
in the study, you may decline to answer any question or you may quit at any time. If you
wish to quit during the interview, please inform the interviewer immediately. If you wish
to quit at a later time, please inform please inform Clara Decerbo at (802) 299-5339 of
your decision.
Rights and Complaints:
If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed, you may discuss your
complaints with Robert Thompson at (401) 874-4485 or rob@uri.edu, or Clara Decerbo
at (802) 299-5339 or clara.decerbo@gmail.com, anonymously, if you choose. In addition,
if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the
office of the Vice President of Research and Economic Development, 70 Lower College
Road, Suite 2, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 8744328.
You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered. Your signature on
this form means that you understand the information and you agree to participate in this
study.
________________________ Signature of Participant
_________________________ Typed/printed Name
__________________________ Date
________________________ Signature of Researcher
________________________ Typed/printed name
_______________________ Date
Please sign both consent forms, keeping one for yourself.
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Appendix B: Interview Guide
Introductory script:
Today I would like to talk with you about resilience in your organization.

Phase 1: Interviewee-led
I would like to begin by having you tell me about your organization and what resilience
means to you in the context of your work.

Follow-up Prompts
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Anything else?
Could you tell me more about that?
Why is _________ important?
What’s being done about that?
What could be done about that?
How does that work?
Are there any actions addressing that problem?
Can you give me an example of that?
Why is that important?
How was that decided?
How does that affect your organization?
Are there any differences of opinion about that?

Phase 2: Interviewer-led

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
1. What can you tell me about partnerships in your organization?
2. ___What are the ways your organization engages in relationship building
activities?
*___ Inter-organizational; *___ Intra-organizational; *___ Mutual Aid
3. ___ What can you tell me about the role/importance the staff/personnel have in
your organization in relation to resilience?
*___ Adequate personnel and staffing; *___ Personal Preparedness; * ___
Family Preparedness
4. ___ Describe the role resource management has in your organization.
[Management of social, financial, human resources/capital]
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___ Effective management of: *___ Social; *___ Financial; * ___
Human/Personnel
___ Resource availability: *___ Knowledge of and access to: *___
Equipment; *___ Personnel; * ___ Information

PLANNING
5. ___What can you tell me about training in your organization?
6. ___What type of events does your organization train for?
*___ How intensely do you train for different types?
*___ Why do you train for these types of events and not others? How do
you decide which events to train for?
7. ___What are the ways your organization engages in internal exercises?
*___ Identify gaps; *___ Identify opportunities
8. ___What are the ways your organization engages in mutual aid exercises? What
are some of the benefits and challenges you encounter?
*___ Coordination *___ Communications
9. ___What can you tell me about education in your organization?
___What are the ways your organization engages in continuing education?
Meeting education requirements?
___What are the ways your organization builds internal expertise?

10.___What can you tell me about disaster or incident pre-planning in your
organization?
*___ Incident pre-plans *___ EOPs

OPERATIONS/LOGISTICS
11. ___What can you tell me about how your organization identifies needs?
12. ___What can you tell me about how your organization establishes objectives?
13. ___How does your organization implement logistics?
14. ___How does your organization manage communications?
*___ Internal; *___ External; *___ Adequate equipment; *___ Interoperability
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15. ___How does your organization manage standardized operating procedures?
___What are the ways your organization implements and uses standard operating
guidelines?
16.___Does your organization use redundant systems? If so, how?
*___ Communication; *___ Supply systems

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
17. ___What can you tell me about your organizational preparedness?
18. ___ Is your organization ready to adapt to changing conditions? Which
conditions? How are you prepared?
*___ Organizational change; *___ Organization structure; *___Climate
change; *___ Extreme Storms; *___ Flooding; *___ Sea Level Rise;
*___Changing needs; *___ Response/call types
19. ___ What are the local risks your organization prepares for?
*___ Human-caused disasters; *___ Terrorism; *___Accidents;
*___Natural disasters; *___Hurricanes; *___Extra Tropical Storms;
*___Floods
20. ___How would you define organizational awareness?
21. ___What can you tell me about your organizational awareness?
*___ Successes; *___ Challenges; *___Improvement areas
22.___What attitude/posture does your organization take towards change?
___How does your organization anticipate impacts? How do you prepare for the
unexpected?
___What is your organizational culture?
*___ Pro-change; *___ Open-minded
___What mindset do you think would be best for improving your organization's
resilience?

77

MANUSCRIPT 3
Building Connections Before the Crisis: Assessing Social Capital in Emergency
Response Organizations

(To be submitted to Journal of Emergency Management)

By
Clara Decerbo a
a

Department of Marine Affairs, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI

78

Abstract
Social capital is widely recognized as a key component of communities’ and
organizations’ ability to withstand and recover from impacts following a disaster. The
aspects of social capital that contribute to building resilient communities also assist
businesses and organizations by establishing and maintaining strong networks of
relationships within teams and between individuals in different organizations. The unique
challenges and functions of emergency response organizations (EROs) demand a greater
focus on identifying and implementing resilience-building practices and policies designed
for EROs. This article presents the findings of a social capital assessment of 41 ERO
leaders in three coastal New England municipalities. The study’s mixed quantitative and
qualitative methods measure the EROs’ levels of bonding, bridging, and linking social
capital and offer recommendations for how social capital may be strengthened to improve
organizational resilience and contribute to community resilience-building initiatives.
While the EROs assessed in this study have high levels of social capital overall, the
organizations’ scores across the three forms of social capital highlight areas of strength
and weakness and suggest areas for future improvement. In order to continue providing
essential life-saving services to their communities during any disaster, EROs must build
and maintain strong relationships and networks with other organizations and focus on
developing and sustaining social capital.
3.1 Introduction
Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and other natural disasters impact millions of
people every year, disrupting communities and causing millions of dollars in damages. A
common approach to mitigating impacts and costs from large scale disasters and
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increasing resilience focuses on policy changes designed to improve critical infrastructure
systems. Social infrastructure also greatly affects community resilience, with elements
such as social capital influencing how communities and organizations withstand and
recover from impacts during and following disasters (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). Social
capital is defined in varying ways across the sociological, psychological, and behavioral
literature. One commonly referenced definition is from Robert Putnam’s book Bowling
Alone: The collapse and revival of American community (2000) in which he defines
social capital as the “features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” and that “enable
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 2000,
pg. 67). A growing body of work focuses on the impact social capital can have on
communities’ ability to mitigate vulnerability and recover after impacts, demonstrating
the key role social capital has in building community resilience (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich
and Meyer, 2014; Aldrich, 2010; Adger, 2003; Murphy, 2007; Cox and Perry, 2011).
New research expands on previous concepts linking social capital with community
resilience to explore the connection between social capital, resilience, and performance
within businesses and organizations. These include but are not limited to schools,
community-based nonprofits, and government organizations (Seville, 2017; Andrews,
2010; Doh and Zolnik, 2011; Foster et al, 2003; Leana and Pil, 2006).
Many components of social capital that contribute to improved resilience within
communities are also applicable to organizations impacted by natural disasters as well as
human-related impacts, such as economic disruptions or problems within the
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organization. Emergency response organizations2 are vulnerable to the same impacts as
non-emergency response businesses, but strategies that may be implemented to assist
other types of organizations are not all applicable to EROs due to their location-based
critical roles during and after disaster impacts. While manufacturing and retail companies
may move to alternative sites and continue business operations prior to disasters and
during recovery efforts, emergency responders must provide essential life-saving services
in the impacted communities where their stations and equipment are located.
Additionally, many emergency response personnel live in or adjacent to the communities
they serve, increasing the likelihood that their own homes and families will be
experiencing the same event or disaster impacting their work communities. These unique
characteristics of EROs demand a greater focus on identifying and implementing
resilience-building practices and policies designed for EROs. Social capital is an essential
component of organizational and community resilience, hence understanding the types
and levels of social capital held by EROs provides important insights into how social
capital may be used to improve ERO resilience. This article presents the findings of a
social capital assessment of ERO leaders and offers recommendations for how elements
of social capital may be applied to EROs to improve organizational resilience and
contribute to community resilience-building initiatives.
Components of social capital, including social networks, reciprocity,
trustworthiness, and access to resources and capital, are essential to the resilience of

2

For the purposes of this research, Emergency Response Organizations are defined as fire, police and law
enforcement, emergency medical services, emergency management agencies, and public works
departments as established by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the Emergency Services
Sector-Specific Plan (Thompson, J. and Durkovich, 2015).
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EROs. This study defines resilience as the “capacity of any entity – an individual, a
community, or an organization – to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and
stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience” (Rodin, 2014). The
presence of high levels of social capital can contribute to higher levels of resilience
within EROs due to stronger social bonds and greater trust between colleagues within the
organization and between response organizations, providing responders with more
information and access to resources. Likewise, the lack of social capital can hinder EROs
in responding to and recovering from large scale disasters due to lack of access to social
networks, resources, and trusted connections. Thus, social capital must be considered as
an essential component of ERO resilience.
Although multiple sources discuss social capital in communities, the literature
reviewed for this study does not address the importance or role of social capital as a
component of resilience in EROs. The purpose of this study is to assess the forms and
levels of social capital currently held by 41 EROs leaders in three case study locations.
As the field of social capital research expands, studies offer new approaches and
recommendations for building and supporting social capital as an avenue to increasing
resilience. The unique challenges inherent in EROs’ roles and responsibilities prior to,
during, and after disasters compel research focused on the forms of social capital held by
EROs. Additionally, the results of this study offer recommendations for ERO leaders on
how they can encourage and support social capital development within their departments
and organizations.
3.2 Background
Defining Social Capital and Resilience
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Hanifan’s study of a rural West Virginia school community center identified
social capital in the contact and fellowship between neighbors and cooperation between
parts of the community that “may easily be directed towards the general improvement of
the community well-being” (Hanifan, 1916, p. 131). This early description of social
capital laid the foundation for many disciplines that have revised and clarified the scope,
components, and outcomes of social capital. Some researchers, notably Coleman (1988),
Putnam (1993), and Bourdieu (1993) describe social capital as consisting of components,
specifically networks, norms, and trust, that form a resource for collective action. The
networks and relationships between individuals and groups or communities are explored
further by Portes (1998) and Putnam (1993). Putnam’s work highlights the importance of
social connectedness, networks, and trust in establishing and maintaining social capital,
elements that reemerge in many subsequent definitions of social capital (Putnam, 1994;
Portes, 1998; Onyx and Bullen, 2000; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). Due to the broad
influence of Putnam’s definition on social capital research, this study utilizes his
definition of the concept, focusing on networks, norms, and trust to evaluate ERO levels
and forms of social capital. As research on social capital examines the networks,
resources, and trust relationships within communities and organizations, the important
ties between social capital and community and organizational resilience are highlighted
(Tompkins, 2005).
The field of resilience research includes social capital as a key element in many
assessments of resilience within communities. Adger’s contributions include examination
of social-ecological resilience in a coastal disaster framework (Adger et al, 2005), social
contracts as a mechanism for climate change adaptation (Adger et al, 2005), and social
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capital as a contributing factor in resiliency and adaptive management (Adger, 2003).
Aldrich expands on Adger’s work on the topic of social capital, arguing for the
reorientation of disaster preparedness and recovery programs and plans to focus on social
infrastructure and social capital instead of “standard fixes” focused on physical
infrastructure and rebuilding (Aldrich, 2010, p. 1). One of the central themes that emerge
from Adger and Aldrich’s work is the key role of social capital as a contributor to
resilient systems.
A capital-based approach to conceptualizing disaster resilience identifies five
major forms of capital (social, economic, physical, human, and natural), extending the
social capital approach outlined by Adger et al. (2005), and providing a framework for
defining and analyzing community disaster resilience (Mayunga, 2007; Tierney 2006).
Aldrich (2012, p. 15) suggests that high levels of social capital serve as the core “engine
of recovery” following a disaster more than commonly discussed factors such as
socioeconomic conditions, population density, amount of damage or aid. Social capital
resources, including networks of strong and weak ties within communities, community
norms, and collective action, may be incorporated and utilized to improve communities’
disaster resilience (Murphy, 2007; Cox and Perry, 2011; Aldrich, 2010; Aldrich, 2012;
Adger, 2003; Adger, 2000; Tobin, 1999).
It is important to keep in mind that social capital can have strong positive and
negative impacts. High levels of social capital within a community can be a benefit to
society, contributing to community disaster resilience and providing critical networks and
resources following a disaster; however, groups such as gangs and organized criminal
enterprises may also have high social capital levels that negatively impact society
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(Murphy, 2007; Aldrich, 2012). In addition, while strong social networks may benefit the
majority of survivors from a disaster, “marginalized groups within society that hold less
social capital benefit little and often are harmed” by the mainstream groups holding
stronger social capital and hence greater power and access to resources following a
disaster (Aldrich, 2012, p. 14). Although there is extensive literature focused on social
capital’s role in community resilience and preparedness, no research identified to date
focuses on the role of social capital in ERO resilience.
Social Capital in Emergency Response Organizations
Due to the critical nature of the work performed by EROs, social capital must be
considered as a key component of ERO resilience. Elements of social capital relevant to
EROs include trust and networks of relationships (Putnam, 2000). Trust is an essential
component of social capital and takes years to build, and times of crisis are when trust is
most needed. If organizations do not invest the necessary time and effort in building
strong social ties of trust and connection prior to a disaster event, ERO leaders will not
have those relationships to draw upon in times of crisis (Seville, 2017). While
relationships between organizations are important, the essential component is the
relationship between people and how well they are connected with each other (Aldrich,
2012; Barabasi, 2002). Seville (2017, p. 74) identified individuals sharing strong
connections as “3:00am friends,” people who already know and trust each other and are
sources that can be called upon at 3:00am for assistance and support when needed.
Stevenson (2014, p. 183) uses the term “relational resilience” to describe the type of
resilience created through patterns of interactions between organizations and people.
Organizations with the capacity to form and manage networks of relationships effectively
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are better able to access resources, information, or support when needed (Seville, 2017;
Stevenson, 2014). Thus, organizations must prioritize and invest in developing and
supporting trust-based relationships with other organizations, and individuals, in order to
build their own resilience (Seville, 2017; Stevenson, 2014). The leaders of EROs are
uniquely positioned to build social capital within their organizations and communities
due to their leadership roles and influence over organizational training, planning, and
management.
Bonding, bridging, and linking relationships are all important forms of social
capital contributing to EROs’ levels of social capital. Bonding social capital, described by
Aldrich and Meyer (2014, p. 5) as the “connections among individuals who are
emotionally close, such as friends or family” is likely to exist within the emergency
responder community. The strong family-like bonds within emergency response
departments are partially formed though organizational acculturation during formal
recruitment and training, but informal social interactions and assimilation also serve to
reinforce these bonds (Myers, 2005). Granovetter’s work describing the “strength of
weak ties” (1973, p. 1361) demonstrates the importance of bridging social capital,
connections spanning social groups. Individuals working in emergency response
organizations have been found to be highly engaged in other community activities that
would contribute to bridging capital such as playing on and coaching sports teams,
participating in religious organizations, and playing active roles in community groups and
clubs (Stebbins and Graham, 2004). The linking form of social capital, “connecting
regular citizens with those in power,” (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014, p. 6) may be found in
EROs through ERO leaders’ frequent contact with local and regional elected and
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appointed leaders. Many municipalities have formal or informal groups including ERO
leaders that act as advisors to municipal leadership during pre-disaster and disaster
periods. This linking connection provides EROs with potential resources during incidents
and may act as a conduit for information sharing.
Approaches to Measuring Social Capital
Three forms of social capital are identified in current social capital research: bonding
social capital, bridging social capital, and linking social capital (Aldrich and Meyer,
2014; Seville, 2017; Foster, 2003; Lancee, 2010). Bonding social capital may be assessed
through identification of social networks, family and social ties, and analysis of levels of
mutual trust and dependence. Bridging social capital can be assessed through proxies
such as ties to social and religious organizations, participation in voluntary associations
and clubs, and engagement with formal and informal support groups. Linking social
capital focuses on the networks and relationships between individuals and communities
and those in power; thus, it may be measured through contact between citizens and
government representatives and civic engagement in local government (Aldrich and
Meyer, 2014).
Within the field of social capital research, there are a variety of approaches to
quantifying and measuring levels of social capital. Three primary approaches are
addressed in the literature: the cognitive approach, behavioral approach, and field
experiment approach. The cognitive approach focuses on identifying and examining
attitudes and behaviors while the behavioral approach focuses on actions taken by
individuals. In the cognitive approach, attitudes of individuals are used to measure
subjective levels of trust (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014; Putnam, 2000).
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Surveys are used to measure general trust as a component of social capital through
multiple choice or scaled questions, asking participants how much they trust their
neighbors, their friends, or specific groups such as community leaders, emergency
responders, or local government officials (Putnam, 2000; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). The
second approach uses behavior-focused surveys to assess specific actions (donating
blood, participating in community events, etc.) of individuals as indicators for levels of
social trust and social capital, the behavioral approach (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014;
National Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 2000, 2006). This approach also
uses individuals’ participation in social and community events such as voting, political
demonstrations, festivals, community organization membership, and volunteering as a
proxy assessment for social capital. The third method uses field experiments such as trust
games to measure social preferences (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). This
method has been used in both laboratory and field experiments (Cardenas and Carpenter,
2008; Levitt and List, 2009).
Some researchers combine these methodological approaches resulting in studies
based on a mix of cognitive and behavioral measures. These studies vary in their methods
with some using qualitative interviews and others multiple choice and Likert-scale
surveys, but they are consistent in their use of both cognitive and behavioral approaches
to measuring social capital. Bell (2009) developed a social capital index through
qualitative interviews examining levels of trust, a cognitive approach, and membership
and volunteer engagement, a behavioral approach. Numerous other researchers
implemented similar approaches in their examinations of social capital in schools,
immigrant communities, and entrepreneurs and in comparing levels of social capital
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between communities (Lancee, 2010; Leana and Pil, 2006; Doh and Zolnik, 2011; Onyx
and Bullen, 2000). By combining cognitive and behavioral approaches to measuring
social capital, these studies demonstrate a holistic method of assessing social capital.
3.3 Methodology
This research seeks to measure the levels of bonding, bridging, and linking forms
of social capital currently held by EROs in in three coastal New England municipalities.
A Likert-scale survey of 41 participants quantitatively measured the levels of bonding,
bridging, and linking social capital of the EROs. Following the survey, semi-structured
interviews conducted with the same participants provided qualitative insights into the
organizations’ social capital, giving context to, and elaborating on, the quantitative
findings.
Case Study Sites and Respondents
Research participants were recruited in three case study sites in southern New
England: Westerly, Rhode Island, West Haven, Connecticut, and Stratford, Connecticut.
The sites are all mid-sized (23,000-54,500 according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 2011)
coastal communities that sustained impact and damages from Superstorm Sandy (2012),
have taken identifiable steps towards reducing future impacts of major storms, and have
municipal-based emergency services including fire departments, police departments,
emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management agencies (EMA), and
public works departments. These sites were selected based on their similarities and
subsequent comparability. Study participants were recruited from each ERO based on
their leadership role within the organization. ERO leaders in each case study site were
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identified based on publicly available information and contacted by email inviting them
to participate in the study. In-person interviews were scheduled in February and March
2018 and conducted by the researcher at the participants’ place of work. A total of 41
ERO leaders were interviewed for this research, 15 in Westerly, 10 in West Haven, and
16 in Stratford, providing a total population sample of ERO leaders in the three study
sites. Participants included leaders from fire departments, police departments, emergency
medical services (EMS), department of public works (DPW), and emergency
management agencies (EMA) (Table 3.1). Due to this study’s small sample size, the
results may not be generalizable to a broader selection of EROs, however the sample
includes the complete leadership of all five EROs in the three case study sites.
Case Study Site

Total Fire

Police

EMS

DPW

EMA

Westerly, RI

15

n=4

n=3

n=3

n=2

n=3

West Haven, CT

10

n=6

n=2

n/a

n=1

n=1

Stratford, CT

16

n=3

n=3

n=5

n=2

n=3

Table 3.1. Research participants represented five emergency response organizations in
three case study sites.
Survey Development, Administration, and Analysis
The study design implemented in this research combines two methodological
approaches to quantifying social capital: the cognitive approach using individuals’
attitudes to measure subjective levels of trust (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014;
Putnam, 2000) and the behavioral approach using community and civic participation,
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engagement, and volunteerism as indicators of social capital (Onyx and Bullen, 2000;
Putnam, 1993; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014; Stone, 2001). These combined approaches
provide a method for quantifying and examining the levels of social capital present in the
case study sites’ EROs. The Likert-scale survey questions are based on the cognitive
approach. Survey questions were developed through a review of the literature as well as
topics related to social capital that emerged through the development of the Emergency
Response Organizational Resiliency Framework (see Manuscript 1) and during mental
model interviews focused on ERO resilience (see Manuscript 2). The draft survey
instrument was tested on six individuals who met the requirements for participation but
worked in jurisdictions outside the case study locations included in this research.
Following testing, three survey questions were revised for clarification and the final
survey instrument was tested on an additional three individuals with no further revisions
made.
The survey instrument consisted of ten 5-point Likert scale questions ranging
from 1 (not at all, never) to 5 (very much, a lot) (Table 3.2). Questions were designed to
quantifiably measure the participants’ levels of three identified forms of social capital:
bonding, bridging, and linking (Putnam, 2000; Mignone and O’Neil, 2005; Aldrich and
Meyer, 2014; Lancee, 2010; Seville, 2017; Kirmayer et al, 2009). Individuals
participating in this study were surveyed by the researcher in person in their place of
work in February and March 2018.
Forms of
Social Capital

Likert Scale Questions
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Bonding

How much do you rely on the leaders/chiefs/directors of your
organization?
How much confidence do you have in the
leaders/chiefs/directors of your organization?
How much do you rely on your colleagues within your
organization?
How much confidence do you have in your colleagues within
your organization?
How much do you rely on your colleagues within your
organization to accomplish your job tasks and goals?

Bridging

How much do you rely on members of other emergency
response organizations within your community? (Other fire
departments, the police department, etc.)
How much do you trust members of other emergency response
organizations within your community? (Other fire departments,
the police department, etc.)
How much do you rely on members of other organizations to
accomplish your organization’s tasks and goals?

Linking

How much do you trust community leaders within your town?
How much connection do you think there is between citizens
and local/municipal government in your community?

Table 3.2. The three forms of social capital measured in this study with their
corresponding Likert-scale survey questions.
Interview Development, Administration, and Analysis
The seven interview questions (Table 3.3) were designed to elicit a qualitative
description of participants’ engagement in their communities, the role of social capital in
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their jobs, organizations, and communities, as well as how social ties and connections
impacted their response during recent disasters. Semi-structured interview questions were
developed based on the methodology described by Wengraf (2001). A list of initial
questions was generated with the goal of eliciting interviewees’ descriptions of bonding,
bridging, and linking social capital in their organizations. In order to maintain
consistency, interview questions were drawn from the same literature and sources as the
survey questions described previously. The draft interview instrument was tested on the
same six individuals as the survey instrument and two interview questions were revised
for clarification based on the test participants’ feedback. The final interview instrument
was tested on three additional individuals with no other revisions made. The original list
of 12 questions was consolidated and revised to the final seven questions based on
feedback from test participants. An additional list of potential follow-up questions was
developed in order to prompt interviewees to expand initial “yes/no” responses if
necessary (Wengraf, 2001). Few research participants needed any prompting from the
researcher during interviews, thus the follow-up question list was not ultimately used
while conducting interviews. All interviews were conducted in the participants’ places of
work during business hours in February and March 2018. Interviews were held privately
in interviewees’ offices or conference rooms in order to maintain privacy and anonymity
of participants’ responses. The interview portion of each meeting was recorded with
permission of the participant for subsequent transcription and coding.
Interview Questions
How often do you participate in community events such as parades, festivals, or
demonstrations?
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How often do you vote?
Do you donate blood? How often?
Are you a member of any community organizations, religious organizations,
voluntary associations or clubs? How many hours do you volunteer/participate
with each per month?
In what ways do social ties and connections function within your organization?
How important are these connections?
In what ways do social ties and connections between your organization and other
organizations within the community function? How do inter-organizational ties
and connections affect your organization? Please describe.
What role did social ties and connections have in your organization’s response
during recent disaster events? (Superstorm Sandy, Winter Storm Nemo, recent
blizzards)
Table 3.3. Interview questions designed to provide a qualitative description of
participants’ bonding, bridging, and linking forms of social capital.
Data Analysis
In order to analyze the collected data, the Likert-scale survey questions were
divided into three groups based on the form of social capital each question corresponded
to (see Table 3.2). Bonding, bridging, and linking scores were calculated for each
participant based on their mean survey responses. The resulting bonding, bridging, and
linking scores were averaged for each ERO within each case study in order to examine
the mean social capital score for the individual emergency response organization. These
scores were analyzed based on case study site and ERO, allowing the researcher to
compare study sites as well as the five EROs. These results offer a quantitative
measurement of the forms and levels of social capital present among EROs in the three
case study sites.
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Responses to the interview portion of the study instrument were transcribed and
qualitatively analyzed with the assistance of NVivo data analysis software using a general
inductive approach (Thomas, 2006). To apply the inductive approach, the researcher
identified and coded key themes including upper-level and lower-level categories
(Thomas, 2006). Examples of upper-level categories include interviewees’ descriptions
of relationships between response organizations and how their EROs obtain needed
resources, while lower-level categories include discussion of specific trainings and
exercises conducted and identification of individual resources such as radio and generator
systems. Following identification and coding of categories, overlapping and redundant
categories were revised and condensed to clarify the key themes and a code book was
developed. Quotations that “convey the core theme or essence of a category” were
selected to capture the key aspects of each theme (Thomas, 2006, p. 242). This method
was selected in order to provide a thorough and descriptive assessment of EROs’ social
capital and the role of social capital within each organization and case study site. The
results of the analysis provide insights into the types and levels of social capital held by
EROs, how they access and use social capital prior to and actively during events, as well
as how ERO leaders use their understanding of social capital’s benefits and potential
costs when dealing with intra- and inter-organizational operations.
3.4 Results
ERO leaders’ responses were compared between case study sites and between
response organizations to provide insight into EROs’ levels and types of social capital.
The type and balance of social capital held by EROs were determined using both the
Likert scale survey data and interview data (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). The survey
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instrument used the cognitive approach to identify levels of trust and confidence
participants had in their leaders and colleagues within the organization, members of other
EROs within their communities, and in community leaders. The qualitative interviews
used the behavioral approach to capture ERO leaders’ displays of social capital in daily
life through such indicators as membership in clubs and associations, volunteer work,
participation in social, religious, and recreational events and altruistic behavior such as
donating blood. Through these approaches the levels of bonding, bridging, and linking
social capital were assessed to identify the types and strengths of connections between
individuals within the same ERO and between members of different organizations.
ERO

Average
Combined

Bonding

Bridging

Linking

Fire (n=13)

3.79

4.27

3.87

3.23

Police (n=8)

3.75

4.10

3.71

3.44

EMA (n=7)

3.82

4.54

3.57

3.36

EMS (n=8)

3.60

4.43

3.04

3.32

DPW (n=5)

3.71

4.24

3.68

3.20

Table 3.4. Social capital components summarized including EROs from all three case
study sites (scale 1-5 with 5 equivalent to highest level).
When comparing the results based on ERO, the average combined social capital
levels including the three identified forms indicate that emergency management agencies
had the highest average social capital score (3.82) on a 1 to 5 scale with 5 indicating the
highest level (see Table 3.4). Fire departments had the next highest score (3.79) followed
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by police departments (3.75) and department of public works (3.71) with emergency
medical services (3.60) holding the lowest average score. The difference in scores
between the five EROs is small, with a range of 0.22 separating the highest and lowest
scores. Examination of the average scores for each of the three forms of social capital
reveals similarly small differences between highest and lowest scores across the
organizations. Bonding scores go from a high of 4.54 (EMA) to a low score of 4.1
(police), a range of 0.44. The highest score in the bridging form was 3.87 (fire) and the
lowest was 3.04 (EMS), a range of 0.83. The range in the linking score is 0.24 with a
high score of 3.44 (police) and a low score of 3.20 (department of public works).
The scores of EROs highlight the components of social capital that are strongest
and weakest within each organization. Most EROs had closely grouped scores across all
components, however EMS had larger differences in their scores, with high scores in
bonding (4.43) and the lowest score of all EROs in all components with 3.04 in linking.
Emergency management agencies had the highest average score as well as the highest
bonding score. Police and fire departments had very similar average scores with fire
departments having higher bonding and bridging scores and police departments having
higher linking scores.
Town and ERO

Average Combined

Bonding

Bridging

Linking

Westerly, RI (n=15)
Average

3.58

4.03

3.81

3.01

Fire (n=4)

3.13

3.35

3.42

2.63

Police (n=3)

3.87

4.07

4.22

3.34
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EMS (n=3)

3.67

4.33

3.67

3.00

DPW (n=2)

3.58

4.00

4.00

2.75

EMA (n=3)

3.65

4.40

3.22

3.34

West Haven, CT (n=10)
Average

3.78

4.38

3.74

3.21

Fire (n=6)

4.08

4.63

4.28

3.33

Police (n=2)

2.96

3.70

3.67

1.50

DPW (n=1)

3.86

4.40

2.67

4.5

EMA (n=1)

4.21

4.80

4.33

3.50

Stratford, CT (n=16)
Average

3.87

4.54

3.58

3.50

Fire (n=3)

4.10

4.80

3.67

3.84

Police (n=3)

3.82

4.40

3.22

3.84

EMS (n=5)

3.55

4.48

2.67

350

DPW (n=2)

4.02

4.40

4.67

3.00

EMA (n=3)

3.87

4.60

3.66

3.34

Table 3.5. Social capital components summarized by case study site and ERO within
each site (scale 1-5 with 5 equivalent to highest level).
Comparing the average combined social capital scores and individual component
scores between the three case study sites highlights areas of social capital strength and
weakness. Stratford EROs had the highest average combined social capital scores of the
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three municipalities (3.87), with West Haven second highest (3.78), and Westerly having
the lowest average score (3.58). There was no consistency across the case study locations
in the type of EROs holding the highest and lowest scores. In Westerly, the police
department had the highest average combined social capital score (3.87) while the fire
department had the lowest score (3.13). In contrast, the West Haven emergency
management personnel had the highest average combined score (4.21) with the police
department holding the lowest average score (2.96). In Stratford, the fire department also
had the highest average score (4.10) while EMS had the lowest score (3.55).
In addition to the social capital scores described above, ERO leaders’ levels of
community engagement were assessed through the interviews based on membership in
community organizations, volunteering, and voting in local as well as state and national
elections. The following results should be interpreted with caution because self-reporting
assessments of volunteering and voting behavior is prone to bias. Individuals may not
accurately report their actions, potentially exaggerating such behaviors. This study used a
self-reporting assessment in order to obtain data comparable to national averages (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2015). 30 (73%) of the 41 participants reported that they were
members of at least one community organization while many participated in numerous
different organizations. One fire chief interviewed was an active member of 12 separate
organizations and clubs and estimated that he spent approximately 80 to 120 hours per
month in volunteer work. In Westerly, 80% of respondents participated in community
organizations spending an average of 17.3 hours per month volunteering (see Table 3.6).
80% of West Haven respondents also participated in community organizations,
volunteering an average of 44.4 hours per month. Only 62.5% of respondents in Stratford
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participated in community organizations, averaging 15.4 hours of volunteer work each
month. Although fewer Stratford respondents engaged in community organizations, and
they volunteered fewer hours than ERO leaders in West Haven and Westerly, all three
case study sites had levels of organizational participation and hours of volunteer work
that were higher than the American national average of 24.9% participation in
organizations and 32.1 hours of volunteer work per year (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2015).
Location

Organizational Participation

Average Volunteer
Hours per Month

Westerly, RI (n=15)

80%

17.3

West Haven, CT (n=10)

80%

44.4

Stratford, CT (n=16)

62.5%

15.4

Table 3.6. Summary of ERO leaders’ self-reported organizational participation and
volunteering.
The ERO leaders participating in this study also had far higher voting rates than
the national average. Among the respondents in all three sites, 90% (37) reported that
they voted in every election, from the local school board to the national presidential
election. The 10% (4) who reported that they did not vote in every election stated that
they voted in every national election but not all local elections. The national average
voter turnout is 60% of the voting age population during presidential elections and 40%
during midterm elections, thus the high levels of voter turnout reported by ERO leaders
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in this study are noteworthy and suggest high levels of engagement with their
communities (United States Elections Project, 2017).
3.5 Discussion
The importance of social capital in community and organizational resilience is
widely recognized (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014; Murphy, 2007; Seville, 2017), but little
research so far has examined social capital within emergency response organizations. The
insights gained from the analysis and description of ERO leaders’ social capital shed light
on the role of social capital in EROs and suggest ways that existing social capital may be
harnessed to build ERO resilience and methods that can be used to increase and sustain
social capital within the emergency response community. The results of this study
clearly indicate that EROs have high levels of social capital overall, while an examination
of the scores across the three identified forms of social capital highlights areas of strength
and weakness.
Examining ERO Social Capital
When comparing the scores for the social capital components between EROs,
each organization’s unique roles and focus are reflected in the high and low scoring
components. The participants with the highest average score were the emergency
management agencies with a score of 3.82 out of 5.00. As leaders of EMAs, individuals
surveyed display high levels of trust and confidence in the members of other emergency
response organizations that they must work with in preparing for and responding to
disasters. In the three case study municipalities, there were no more than three individuals
working in EMA for each town and in West Haven there is only one person engaged in
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EMA work on a part-time basis. During interviews, study participants revealed that this
level of staffing is typical for emergency management agencies on the municipal level in
the New England region where many towns have part-time EMA personnel or full-time
fire or police personnel who are tasked with additional emergency management
responsibilities. Given that the EMA organizations in the case study sites have such low
staffing levels, it is essential that EMA leaders work closely and have strong connections
with the leaders of other EROs in their towns. As one participant told the researcher, “I
can’t save this town by myself if a big storm hits, I have to work with fire, with police,
with everyone and maybe together we can prevent the worst from happening.” EMA
leaders also had the highest average bonding score (4.54), providing further evidence of
the strong connections maintained within the emergency response community, especially
within the emergency management agencies. Due to the small sample size obtained for
this study, these results may not be representative of the larger ERO population, however
they provide preliminary findings that may be expanded in future research.
Fire departments in this study had the highest average scores in bridging social
capital (3.87) and the second highest overall score (3.79). Active engagement and
participation with communities and other emergency responders is part of the culture of
fire departments (Alyn, 2010; Stinchcomb and Ordaz, 2007; Gregory, 2012). Many fire
chiefs brought this up during interviews. Building relationships with the communities
they serve is considered “essential for maintaining good operations and providing the best
service possible,” as one chief stated. Another chief noted that having close relationships
with other emergency responders, especially EMS and police, “improves
communications, builds camaraderie, and is essential for good operations in the field,”
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adding that “we all get more done when we can work well together.” Of the 13 fire chiefs
interviewed for this study, 10 reported that, in the words of one interviewee, “treating
each other like family” was a key component of fire department culture, supporting the
high scores in the bonding form of social capital. The Westerly, West Haven, and
Stratford fire departments actively engage in mutual aid with adjacent towns and districts,
including participating in inter-departmental trainings throughout the year. Mutual aid
agreements exist in many emergency response organizations and consist of formal or
informal arrangements to assist neighboring departments when they are in need of
additional personnel or resources. Common examples of mutual aid include an
ambulance crew responding into a neighboring town for an emergency when that town’s
ambulances are already occupied, or multiple towns in an area sending fire engines and
personnel to large structure fires. A Westerly fire chief described during his interview
how large incidents like major structure fires will usually result in firefighters from
Westerly, Charlestown, Ashaway, Richmond, and Hope Valley Fire Departments
working together in order to control and extinguish the fire. These types of participation
in mutual aid agreements and training serve as one mechanism through which fire
departments can maintain and build their bridging social capital, increasing the strength
of connections between individuals in different departments and organizations.
The department of public works leaders had the fourth lowest average score
(3.71) and bonding score (4.24) and lowest linking score of all EROs surveyed (3.2).
Unlike the fire, police, and EMS departments, department of public work leaders
participated in community organizations and events at far lower levels than other ERO
leaders. The respondents did not rank engagement with other EROs as important for their
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jobs or organizations and were not concerned with building relationships with members
of other EROs within their communities. One director of public works noted the
importance of “building camaraderie and working together during big storms,” indicating
that he wanted to have the social capital established and available to access during events.
However, all public works directors interviewed reported that they were not considering
efforts to build those relationships and connections prior to an incident or disaster.
Multiple fire, police, and EMA personnel interviewed stated, in the words of one EMA
director, “you don’t want to be trading phone numbers on the fire scene, you never want
to trade business cards during the storm,” highlighting the importance of establishing
relationships on “blue sky days,” prior to disasters or major events.
Changing Communities
One concern voiced by multiple interview participants was the impact of shifting
populations within communities and changes in the composition of EROs and their
personnel. As one fire chief stated: “Back when I joined the department all the guys were
from here, a lot of us grew up together, we went to school together, we all lived in
town… our kids went to school together, our wives were friends, we all knew each other
and we knew this town. This new generation, they aren’t from here… we are hiring guys
who live 45 minutes or an hour away, they come in for their shift and they go home, they
aren’t connected to the community anymore.” The changes in where emergency response
personnel lived in relation to their departments was noted particularly by ERO leaders in
Westerly and West Haven, however Stratford leaders also expressed concern that their
personnel no longer had “connections with the community.” As new emergency
responders are hired who live outside the communities they serve, they no longer live in
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the same neighborhoods, attend the same churches, and have children on the same sports
teams. These findings reflect Putnam’s concerns about declining civic engagement and
social trust, accompanied by decreasing levels of social capital linked with demographic
changes such as where individuals live in relation to their places of work (Putnam, 1994;
Putnam, 1995). As one fire chief stated during an interview, he felt like his personnel
were “coming to work for the paycheck” and he missed the “camaraderie of the old
days.” Numerous fire, police, and EMS leaders echoed this sentiment in interviews.
Despite these concerns, two fire chiefs noted that changes in organizational hiring
practices and, in the words of one interviewee, the increasing “professionalization of
emergency response” resulted in higher quality candidates and better skill levels among
their personnel. One fire chief stated, “back in the old days the main requirement to
become a firefighter was a pulse and a reckless disregard for danger, now we are getting
applicants with college degrees, they are brilliant paramedics and firefighters and they are
improving the whole level of the service we provide to the community.”
Building and Sustaining Social Capital
Although emergency response organizations’ personnel may no longer all live in
the community they serve due to changes in organizational hiring practices and
community composition, in interviews ERO leaders emphasized the importance of
building and sustaining strong relationships within their own organizations and with their
partners in the emergency response community. ERO leaders participating in this
research echoed some of Putnam’s recommendations for encouraging and sustaining
social capital. Social capital “tends to be self-reinforcing and cumulative” such that
“successful collaboration in one endeavor builds connections and trust… in other
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unrelated tasks” (Putnam, 1993, p. 4). Multiple ERO leaders stated that they felt
cooperation and collaboration during normal day-to-day operations, including training,
cooking meals, and cleaning stations and apparatus, fostered stronger bonds within their
departments. They also reported that regular formal and informal interactions with other
emergency response organizations, including official drills and trainings as well as cookouts and softball games, built connections and relationships with neighboring
departments and agencies. During interviews, emergency response leaders discussed their
active engagement in planning, training, and drilling, within their departments and with
other organizations in their town and region. Additionally, participants discussed the
importance of supporting a culture of continual improvement and development of new
policies and practices to ensure they are serving their communities as safely and
effectively as possible.
Although social capital has many benefits for EROs, it is important to be aware of
potential negative side effects of social capital. As Durlauf (1999) notes, strong
identification with a particular group or community (fire department, emergency response
agency) can lead to inter-group hostility and potential conflicts with other organizations.
Benefits accrued from social capital may not be shared with outsiders or minority groups
(Onyx and Bullen, 2000). High levels of social capital can also give some groups priority
access to critical resources, thereby depriving low social capital individuals or
communities of needed resources (Aldrich 2012). One participant alluded to this when
recounting an incident that occurred during Superstorm Sandy 2012. The emergency
dispatch center for the town lost power during the storm, requiring the department to
switch over to back-up generator power. The back-up generator functioned well and
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power was restored to the dispatch center quickly, but the ERO leader said that he had
“made a few calls and had three more generators and a fuel truck in reserve” if necessary.
By leveraging personal relationships and networks, the ERO leader ensured that his
dispatch center had multiple back-up power sources, but also prevented these resources
from being distributed to other locations that may have had critical needs as well.
Although no ERO leaders specifically addressed the potential negative side effects of
social capital, one police chief stated in an interview that “in the response community we
are a family, we take care of each other first,” echoing the sentiments of a fire chief who
emphasized that “the brotherhood and sisterhood comes first.” This display of high levels
of bonding social capital has the potential to lead to exclusion of individuals identified as
“outsiders” and protection of the “brotherhood/sisterhood” to the possible detriment of
the larger community.
3.6 Recommendations and Conclusion
The results of this research offer insights and recommendations for how EROs
can build and sustain social capital within their organizations as well as highlighting
areas for future research. Conscious efforts to identify, support, and encourage the
development of social capital within and between organizations may be incorporated into
existing training and organizational improvement strategies. Such efforts can be as simple
as inviting departments in neighboring towns to train together more regularly, or hosting
a table-top exercise incorporating all emergency response organizations in a municipality.
This study revealed that fire, police, and EMS departments regularly work together
during daily operations, building familiarity and relationships. Due to the roles and
responsibilities of their normal operations, EMA and department of public works do not
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interact as often with the other response organizations. Thus, it is essential to include
EMA and department of public works personnel in training and exercises whenever
possible to ensure strong relationships are established with all response organizations
prior to a large-scale event. In order to build their overall social capital, EMA and DPW
leaders must understand that relationships forged during non-disaster interactions are
more quickly activated during times of crisis and therefore far more helpful than relying
on building relationships during an event.
Although previous research has identified multiple approaches to building social
capital within communities and institutions, this study suggests ways these methods may
be applied to emergency response organizations. Research supports the importance of
local leaders and organizations in the establishment and development of informal
networks that contribute to building trust (Krishna, 2007). Other research
recommendations include implementation of policies to incentivize community
participation in order to foster and strengthen community bonds (Aldrich, 2010; Lietaer,
2004). Aldrich (2012) highlights the role of community clubs, faith organizations, nonprofits, and volunteer groups in increasing social capital by building trust and networks.
These same methods of building social capital may be applied to emergency response
organizations. ERO leaders can take active roles in developing both formal and informal
networks within their organizations and with other response partners. Such actions may
include encouraging a culture of collaboration and cooperation within their departments
and providing opportunities to work with and build relationships with partner
organizations through trainings and exercises. In addition to work-related joint trainings,
hosting events such as cook outs or organizing softball tournaments with ERO partners
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give individuals and organizations the chance to meet and build relationships prior to
disasters. In addition, EROs could implement policies that incentivize their members’
participation in community organizations and activities, thereby establishing and
supporting networks within their communities.
Although this research provides initial findings analyzing social capital in EROs,
additional research is needed. An examination of the relative importance of each
component of social capital to overall ERO resilience could give future training and
education plans better focus and provide guidance on the most effective and efficient
measures to implement to improve ERO social capital. Additional research on social
capital in EROs can assist in identifying the specific forms of social capital that have the
greatest impact on improving ERO resilience and explore potential connections with
increasing community resilience. The connection between ERO resilience and
community resilience must be investigated further in order to determine the methods and
strategies that are most effective in improving both ERO and community resilience,
including how social capital may be leveraged to increase resilience. Conducting similar
research in other areas of the country and around the world would provide an opportunity
to investigate social capital in EROs with different organizational structures responding
to a variety of risks and hazards. Evaluating the role of social capital in EROs in a wider
context would address the geographical and sample size limitations of this preliminary
study and may provide results that are generalizable to the broader field of emergency
response resilience. Future studies including emergency response staff and personnel, in
addition to the organization leaders, may provide insight on variations in social capital in
different hierarchical levels of EROs. The subject of emergency response organization
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resilience and social capital research offers many opportunities for future studies with
results contributing to the broader field of organizational and community resilience.
Social capital is a critical component of resilience for organizations and
communities. EROs provide essential services to communities on a daily basis as well as
during disasters or large-scale events; thus, the resilience of EROs can directly contribute
to community resilience. High levels of social capital within EROs contribute to building
more resilient and robust organizations that can withstand impacts while continuing to
provide critical services; thus, social capital of EROs must be a topic of inquiry. In this
assessment of EROs’ levels of social capital in three coastal New England municipalities,
the varying levels and forms of social capital highlight areas of strength and weakness
within EROs. Through this examination of current social capital levels, areas for future
focus and growth have been identified for inclusion in training, planning, and
consideration of goals for each organization. Current world events including rapidly
shifting political situations, climate change, and increasingly frequent natural disasters
are forming an environment of constant change and uncertainty in which organizations
and communities must be resilient in order to survive. Emergency response organizations
are strongly rooted in their histories and traditions, but must embrace resilience to ensure
their ability to continue providing essential services to their communities. It is crucial that
EROs build and maintain strong relationships and networks between organizations in
order for them to fulfill their mission: ensuring the health and safety of the communities
they serve.
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Appendix A: Social Capital Survey and Interview Instrument
Please rank the following questions on a scale of 1-5 with 1 equivalent to “not at all” and
5 equivalent to “very much”:
1. How much do you rely on the leaders/chiefs/directors of your organization?
2. How much confidence do you have in the leaders/chiefs/directors of your
organization?
3. How much do you rely on your colleagues within your organization?
4. How much confidence do you have in your colleagues within your organization?
5. How much do you rely on members of other emergency response organizations
within your community? (Other fire departments, the police department, etc.)
6. How much do you trust members of other emergency response organizations
within your community? (Other fire departments, the police department, etc.)
7. How much do you trust community leaders within your town?
8. How much do you rely on your colleagues within your organization to accomplish
your job tasks and goals?
9. How much do you rely on members of other organizations to accomplish your
organization’s tasks and goals?
10. How much connection do you think there is between citizens and local/municipal
government in your community? (1 = none, 5 = highly connected)
Please answer the following questions and describe your answers:
1. How often do you participate in community events such as parades, festivals, or
demonstrations?
2. How often do you vote?
3. Do you donate blood? How often?
4. Are you a member of any community organizations, religious organizations,
voluntary associations or clubs? How many hours do you volunteer/participate
with each per month?
5. In what ways do social ties and connections function within your organization?
[For each of the listed functions indicate its importance on a Likert scale]
6. In what ways do social ties and connections between your organization and other
organizations within the community function? How do inter-organizational ties
and connections affect your organization? Please describe.
7. What role did social ties and connections have in your organization’s response
during recent disaster events? (Superstorm Sandy, Winter Storm Nemo, recent
blizzards) Please describe, then rank each role’s importance from 1-5.
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CONCLUSION
The challenges facing emergency response organizations today are growing larger
and more complex in a rapidly evolving world of climate change, natural disasters, drug
epidemics, international and domestic terrorism, and increasingly frequent active shooter
incidents. In order to be better prepared to withstand impacts and continue providing
critical services to communities during and after disaster events, EROs must become
stronger and more resilient. Emergency responders strongly believe in time-honored
traditions and some may be resistant to change, but ERO leaders acknowledge that the
world is changing around them and they must proactively engage in efforts to incorporate
new concepts such as resilience in their plans, policies, and response operations. The
emergency response organizational resilience factors identified through the Delphi expert
survey form a foundation on which to build stronger, more resilient response
organizations that will be prepared to face new and unexpected threats and challenges in
the future. By implementing the eleven key factors identified through this research,
emergency response organizations can grow into resilient organizations better prepared to
serve and protect their communities in an age of increasing change.
The understanding of ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience gained through
this research provide important insights and recommendations for future applications of
resiliency-building initiatives in an emergency response context. ERO leaders have
notably balanced and comprehensive default models of resilience and they are familiar
with the core ERO resiliency components of resource management, planning,
operations/logistics, and situational awareness. ERO leaders are also able and willing to
change their mental models of resilience when reminded of the various components
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contributing to ERO resilience, indicating that tailored trainings and education efforts
may produce effective change in EROs’ overall models of resilience. Actively
encouraging leaders from emergency response organizations, including public works
departments, to get involved in current community emergency planning initiatives and
proactively discussing the role of resilience in their organizations is a good initial step.
Throughout the research process, multiple ERO leaders in all three case study sites
requested feedback from the researcher following completion of the study on how their
organizations can take steps to become more resilient. There is a clear desire among ERO
leaders to be as prepared as they can possibly be, and there is increasing understanding
that resilience needs to play an important role in ERO planning, policies, and training.
Identifying gaps in ERO personnel and leaders’ mental models of resilience
highlight opportunities to tailor education, training, and outreach efforts to address the
aspects of ERO resilience that they are less familiar with and/or do not understand fully.
It is important to note that it may be difficult to motivate ERO personnel to change longstanding traditions and practices and it is vital to clearly demonstrate how resilience
factors and strategies will improve their ability to safely and successfully fulfill their
critical life-safety function during times of disaster. In addition, evaluating EROs’ level
and type of social capital can assist in identifying key methods for supporting existing
relationships and networks and establishing new ones. Through an examination of current
social capital levels, areas for future focus and growth may be identified for inclusion in
training, planning, and consideration of goals for each organization.
The effective incorporation of resiliency-building factors and practices in EROs
requires additional research to identify the best methods for teaching resilience principles
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and strategies to emergency responders. Additionally, the connection between ERO
resilience and community resilience must be investigated further in order to determine the
methods and strategies that are most effective in improving both ERO and community
resilience. Building resilient EROs is an essential component in the development of
resilient communities, and the results of this research highlight key areas to focus future
education and planning efforts. Emergency response organizations are strongly rooted in
their histories and traditions, but must embrace resilience to ensure their ability to
continue providing essential services to their communities.
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